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Exclusive dealing, the theory 
of the firm, and raising rivals' 
costs: Toward a new synthesis 
BY ALAN J. MEESE* 
Exclusive dealing is ubiquitous. Most lawyers and professors have 
exclusive agreements with their employers. A professor at William 
and Mary cannot simultaneously teach at Washington and Lee, at 
least not without the former's consent.1 A partner at Skadden, Arps 
cannot "moonlight" for Cravath, Swaine & Moore. The manager of a 
Ford plant would quickly lose his job if he allowed General Motors to 
use the plant on weekends. Each such condition of employment 
deprives rivals or potential rivals of inputs (human or physical capi-
tal) they might otherwise employ to improve their own products and 
thus enhance "competition." 
* Ball Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, 
VA. 
AUTI-IOR'SNOTE: I thank the Department of Justice for the invitation to participate in 
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outside income without first obtaining written consent of the Provost); id. at 
70 (faculty generally may not work more than one day per week for other 
entities). 
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These contracts govern behavior that takes place within an indi-
vidual firm and thus constitute "unilateral" conduct under the Sher-
man Act.2 But there are also exclusive agreements between two or 
more distinct firms, what antitrust calls "concerted" action. McDon-
ald's might tell its franchisees that they cannot also serve as fran-
chisees for Burger King or, for that matter, work anywhere else while 
operating under the McDonald's trademark.3 They might buttress this 
requirement with a noncompete clause, preventing franchisees from 
working for other franchise systems for, say, five years after they part 
company with McDonald's.4 In the same way, Ford may prevent its 
dealers from selling Chevrolets, or Exxon may require its "indepen-
dent" stations to sell Exxon-and only Exxon-gasoline.5 Like "uni-
lateral" exclusive dealing, such agreements deprive rivals of 
inputs-including distribution services-they might otherwise 
employ to enhance moment-to-moment rivalry. 
Such arrangements are so pervasive and arise in so many compet-
itive markets that it seems safe to assume that a majority of them are 
beneficial or benign. Even Skadden, Arps, after all, faces stiff competi-
tion, and many smaller law firms that face even more rivalry also 
See Copperweld Sheet & Tube v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 
752 (1985) ("agreements" that take place within an individual firm are 
unilateral conduct, governed only by section 2 of the Sherman Act). Cf. 
Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (price fixing 
between members of the same partnership would be "perfectly proper," i.e., 
beyond the scope of section 1). 
See Patrick J. Kaufman & Francine LaFontaine, Costs of Control: The 
Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 417 (1994) 
(describing provision in McDonald's franchise contracts requiring franchisees 
to devote full-time efforts to operation of franchise). See also McDonald's 
Sys., Inc. v. Sandy's, Inc., 195 N.E.2d 22 (2d Dist. Ill. 1963) (enforcing clause 
preventing franchisee from opening competing restaurant under its own 
trademark). 
See McCart v. H.&R. Block, 470 N.E.2d 756 (3d Dist. Ind. 1984) 
(upholding covenant not to compete with franchise system for 2 years after 
franchisee's separation from the system). 
s See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (evaluating 
contracts requiring Standard Oil's franchisee stations to sell only Standard's 
gasoline). 
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impose exclusivity on their members.6 As William Howard Taft noted 
with approval, the common law not only enforced such restraints: it 
encouraged them.? 
Indeed, most cooperation takes place within individual firms, pur-
suant to the nonstandard contract that economists call complete vertical 
integration.8 Such integration, and the cooperation it entails, often 
requires exclusivity, and economists presume that such integration is 
beneficial or benign.9 This presumption seems particularly apt in an 
economy like our own, which embraces private property and free con-
tract with relatively few state-created barriers to entry.10 
Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 
22 (1979) (fact that smaller rivals had adopted arrangement similar to that 
under challenge militated against per se condemnation and in favor of rule of 
reason treatment). 
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (1898) 
(Taft, J.), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (noting with approval that, at common law, 
"restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business activities of the 
members ... were to be encouraged") (emphasis added). 
See 7 PHILUP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 'll1464c, at 206 (2003) (intrafirm 
collaboration is more pervasive than collaboration between separate firms); 
Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 
713, 714 (1992) (most economic cooperation takes place within firm 
boundaries). See also 7 AREEDA, supra, at 236 (''lntraenterprise contracts, like 
pure unilateral cooperation, are natural and efficient."). 
See 0LNER F. WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAUSM 28 (1985) 
(articulating "rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of 
contracting-[including complete integration] have efficiency purposes"); 
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297, 
308-10 (1978) (explaining how firms can protect themselves from 
opportunism by purchasing a supplier and thereby imposing exclusive 
dealing). See also 7 AREEDA, supra note 8, 'II 1464c, at 207 (intraenterprise 
cooperation is natural and efficient); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton 
Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) ("Vertical integration 
is a universal feature of economic life and it would be absurd to make it a 
suspect category under the antitrust laws just because it may hurt suppliers 
of the service that has been brought within the firm."). 
10 See generally Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development, 102 
MICH. L. REv. 1044, 1086-1100 (2004) (suggesting that stricter antitrust 
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These same considerations suggest a similar presumption for 
exclusive dealing arrangements involving two or more firms. After 
all, the theory of the firm teaches that partial integration can serve the 
very same purpose as cooperation that takes place within the confines 
of a single entity.11 Moreover, such integration is less permanent than 
complete integration, suggesting a smaller potential for anticompeti-
tive harm. It would therefore seem proper to assume that such inte-
gration is also beneficial.12 
Such a presumption is not irrebutable; some such restraints can 
harm consumers and destroy wealth.13 The challenge of antitrust law, 
then is to identify that subset of exclusive dealing agreements-
whether "unilateral" or "concerted"-that produce economic harm, 
without banning or deterring the majority of such agreements that 
produce wealth.14 Moreover, it is not enough that courts or scholars 
be able to draw such distinctions in theory; they must be able to artic-
ulate standards that do so at a reasonable cost and without deterring 
too much beneficial conduct. 
This article offers a framework for separating the wheat from the 
chaff when it comes to exclusive dealing arrangements. To this end 
the article begins by identifying the source of previous and current 
flawed approaches to analyzing such agreements. Thus, section I 
reviews the law that governed exclusive dealing during the so-called 
inhospitality era of antitrust law and policy. Section II examines the 
regulation may be appropriate in countries where background rules render 
capital formation and entry more difficult). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1984) (arguing that the absence of 
market power suggests that a practice under scrutiny is beneficial). 
n See nn.118-20, infra and accompanying text. 
12 See generally Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the 
Firm, 83 N.C. L. REv. 5 (2004) (contending that courts should treat "concerted" 
and "unilateral" intra brand restraints the same way). 
13 See nn.149-60, infra and accompanying text (explaining how such 
restraints can restrain competition in a manner that destroys wealth). 
14 Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (explaining 
that Sherman Act bans only "undue" restraints of trade because most 
contracts facilitate beneficial rivalry). 
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basis for that era's hostility toward such agreements, neoclassical price 
theory, the dominant economic paradigm of the time. Price theory, it is 
shown, relied upon a technological theory of the firm, a theory that 
attributed unique economic properties to economic activity that took 
place within the boundaries of an individual business enterprise. At 
the same time, price theory saw no beneficial purposes for nonstan-
dard contracts, including exclusive dealing, that reached beyond an 
individual firm and thus constrained the actions of two or more 
legally separate entities. As a result, price theory interpreted these 
arrangements as instances of "coercive leverage," whereby a seller 
employed market power to impose such agreements upon unwilling 
buyers, as a means of preserving or extending a firm's market power. 
Under the influence of price theory, courts articulated doctrine that 
was extremely hostile to such agreements, whether analyzed under 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act. 
Section III reviews and summarizes two critiques of the doctrine 
that courts developed during the inhospitality era. The Chicago 
school, it is shown, itself invoked "price theory" to argue that firms 
could not successfully employ exclusive dealing arrangements to 
acquire, maintain or extend market power. Chicagoans did not affir-
matively emphasize any benefits that such restraints created, but 
instead inferred the existence of such benefits from the absence of 
competitive harm. For its part, transaction cost economics (TCE) artic-
ulated an entirely new theory of the firm, a theory that also helped 
explain various forms of partial integration, including exclusive deal-
ing. Moreover, while the Chicago school had simply inferred that 
exclusive dealing produced benefits, TCE actually explained what 
those benefits were. Taken together, the Chicago and TCE critiques 
impelled scholars, judges and enforcement officials to abandon the 
more extreme manifestations of the inhospitality approach to 
antitrust regulation. 
Section IV shows how raising rivals' costs (RRC) theory filled the gap 
left by the collapse of price theory's account of exclusive dealing agree-
ments. RRC, it is shown, has offered the only plausible, extant account of 
how such restraints could limit rivalry in a manner that harms con-
sumers and destroys wealth. Section V shows how courts have altered 
antitrust law's approach to exclusive dealing in the midst of these devel-
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opments in economic theory. Courts, it is shown, are less hostile to vari-
ous forms of exclusive dealing than they once were, particularly arrange-
ments that take the form of so-called concerted action. At the same 
time-and consistent with price theory-courts are still more hostile to 
"concerted" exclusive dealing than they are to unilateral refusals to deal. 
Section VI offers a critique of certain approaches to rule of reason 
analysis of such restraints taken by some modern courts and scholars. 
For instance, the section critiques a "foreclosure" based rule of reason 
that all courts still apply in the monopolization context and some 
apply even when the defendant has no monopoly. This section argues 
that mere foreclosure-even substantial foreclosure-should not suf-
fice to establish a prima facie case, even where the defendant has a 
monopoly. Moreover, if courts do allow plaintiffs to establish a prima 
facie case in this manner, and if a defendant shows that the restraint 
produces benefits, courts should not ''balance" these benefits against 
a restraint's supposed competitive harms. At the same time, the pres-
ence of a so-called less restrictive alternative should be irrelevant to a 
court's appraisal of such efficiencies. Any such reliance on balancing 
and less restrictive alternatives reflects an outmoded, price-theoretic 
approach to such agreements, an approach premised upon the so-
called partial equilibrium welfare tradeoff model originally devel-
oped for evaluation of mergers that create both market power and 
benefits. This section offers a similar critique of a rule of reason based 
upon proof of "actual detrimental effects." 
Section VII of the article offers its own proposal for how courts 
should analyze exclusive dealing arrangements that take place both 
inside and outside the firm. Plaintiffs, it is argued, should have to do the 
"hard work" of proving the various necessary conditions for a raising 
rivals' costs strategy to succeed, even when the defendant has a 
monopoly. Then, and only then, should a court shift a burden of produc-
tion to the defendant. Here, it would seem that balancing is called for. At 
the same time, the outcome of such balancing may well likely depend 
upon what is essentially a normative choice between a purchaser welfare 
approach to antitrust, on the one hand, and a total welfare approach, on 
the other. Choice of a total welfare approach, it is shown, will require 
courts to reject atta~ on agreements that really do produce significant 
efficiencies. On the other hand, those who have advocated the former, 
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"purchaser welfare" approach have failed to offer a methodology for 
conducting such balancing, given that exclusive dealing arrangements 
that create both benefits and market power may actually enhance the 
welfare of some purchasers compared to the status quo ante. 
I. ANTITRUST'S ONE-TIME HOSTILITY 
TO EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
For several decades, antitrust doctrine governing exclusive deal-
ing was vastly overinclusive, at least as applied to what courts 
deemed "concerted action." Taken together, the major decisions of 
the era banned such agreements whenever they foreclosed rivals 
from a "significant" portion of the marketplace, regardless of any 
benefits such agreements may have produced.15 For instance, exclu-
sive dealing agreements entered by monopolists were basically 
unlawful per se, without regard to their economic impact.16 More-
over, courts reached similar results even when defendants were not 
monopolists. For example, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the 
United States challenged, under section 3 of the Clayton Act, agree-
ments between Standard Oil and its franchisee stations requiring the 
latter to deal only in Standard Oil fuels.J7 The agreements in question 
15 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (applying 
section 3 of the Clayton Act) [hereinafter Standard Stations]; United States v. 
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (applying section 2 of the Sherman Act). See also 
Loraine Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (finding exclusive 
dealing to be a predatory act that supported a claim for attempted 
monopolization); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 
349 (banning exclusive dealing contract under section 3 of the Clayton Act 
that bound 40% of nation's dealers). See also nn.16-25, infra and 
accompanying text (describing case law of the period). 
For an illuminating exegesis and analysis of the law of exclusive 
dealing, see Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, "Foreclosure," and 
Consumer Harm, 70 AmrrRusr L.J. 311 (2002). 
16 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 578 (1966); United 
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
17 Standard Stations, supra note 15. In the parlance of the industry, 
Standard Oil did not allow "split pump" stations. 
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bound dealers selling about seven percent of the region's gasoline.18 
Several other major refiners had similar arrangements with their 
dealers, while a few smaller refineries sold, and "independent" deal-
ers purchased, gasoline in the spot market or pursuant to longer-
term arrangements that allowed dealers to "split their pumps" 
between products of different refiners.19 After an exhaustive review 
of the law and policy governing such agreements, the Court 
announced that, in such circumstances, exclusive dealing arrange-
ments were unlawful whenever they foreclosed a significant share of 
the market, with seven percent sufficing as "significant." 20 Such 
agreements, the Court said, created a "clog on competition," with the 
Justices apparently equating "competition" with atomistic rivalry in 
the spot market.21 It would not matter, the Court said, if a "short run 
by product" of the agreements was to reduce costs and thus enhance 
efficiency, because the antitrust laws were premised upon the 
18 See id. at 295. 
19 See id. at 295 (noting that Standard and its six major rivals accounted 
for 66% of the gasoline sold in the western United States; about 70 other 
refiners accounted for the other 34% of the market; and 1%-2% of the region's 
retailers were "split pump" stations). 
20 See id. at 300-15. It should be noted that the precise holding in 
Standard Stations has always been a matter of some dispute. While some 
believe that the Court ultimately focused on the raw quantity of the 
foreclosure, others have claimed that the Court focused on the "quality" of 
the foreclosure, i.e., the share of the market combined with other structural 
characteristics of the market. 
21 See id. at 314. See also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the 
Rule of Reason, 2003 ILL. L. REv. 77, 124-34 (explaining how the Supreme Court 
embraced an atomistic conception of "competition" during this period). 
Lower courts took the same approach. See Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 
1178 (lOth Cir. 1973) (finding sufficient foreclosure whenever manufacturer 
possessed market power); Mytinger & Castleberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534 
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (finding that foreclosure of 8.6% of the market sufficed to find 
such exclusive dealing unlawful under section 5 of the FTC Act); Dictograph 
Prod. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821,828 (2d Cir. 1954) ("It is the policy of the Congress 
that [the defendant's] merchandise must stand on its own feet in the open 
market, without the competitive advantage to be obtained by the use of 
prohibited exclusionary agreements."). 
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assumption that society's long-run advantage depended upon the 
removal of restraints on (atomistic) "competition."22 
A few years later the Court would endorse the same approach 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, affirming a district court decision 
that read the requirements of section 1 as coextensive with those of 
section 3 of the Clayton Act.23 About 15 years later the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) would go even further, successfully challenging, 
under section 5 of the FTC Act, an arrangement that bound only one 
percent of the relevant market's dealers to primary dealing contracts 
that also allowed them to distribute some products of other manufac-
turers.24 The Commission found a sympathetic ear at the Supreme 
Court, which opined that such agreements offended the "central pol-
icy of the Sherman Act" by interfering with an "open" competitive 
market.2s Moreover, because courts were so hostile to these agree-
ments, very few seemed to escape summary condemnation. Thus, 
courts had little occasion to develop standards governing the analysis 
of such restraints under a full blown rule of reason. 
At the same time, most exclusive dealing was lawful per se, tak-
ing place as it did within the boundaries of a single firm. 26 For 
instance, Standard Oil owned many gasoline stations outright when 
22 Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 309. The court also opined that firms 
could achieve any efficiencies through means less restrictive of competition. 
See id. at 313-14 (contending that parties would deal exclusively without 
contractual requirement if such exclusivity produced benefits). 
23 See United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 
1951), affd, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (applying test articulated in Standard Stations 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
24 See In re Brown Shoe, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963), affd, FTC v. Brown Shoe 
Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). See Brown Shoe, 62 F.T.C. at 716 (finding it irrelevant 
that the arrangement governed {)nly 1% of the nation's dealers). 
25 See Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. at 320-21. It should be noted that, despite its 
invocation of the Sherman Act, the Court ultimately rested its judgment upon 
section 5 of the FTC Act. 
26 Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984) (intraenterprise agreements cannot violate section 1 of the Sherman 
Act). See n.8, supra (collecting citations for the proposition that most economic 
cooperation occurs within firrns). 
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the United States challenged its exclusive dealing contracts.27 The 
record in the case does not suggest that these stations were free to 
sell whichever gasoline they pleased! Such exclusive dealing was not 
accidental, but was presumably the product of agreements between 
the firm's owners and those employees who managed the individual 
stations.28 A station manager who decided to purchase and sell the 
"best" gasoline he could find in a given week would find himself 
looking for another job, and without recourse under the antitrust 
laws. The only possible exception would have been for cases in 
which the defendant had a monopoly, and refused to deal with rivals 
for the purpose of maintaining such market dominance.29 Possession 
of mere market power did not suffice to establish monopoly power, 
however.30 
II. THE SOURCE OF HOSTILITY: PRICE THEORY, 
WORKABLE COMPETITION, AND THE 
INHOSPITALITY TRADITION 
What, then, accounted for this stark distinction between agreements 
that took place within a particular firm, on the one hand, and those that 
reached beyond it and bound other firms? The answer-or at least part 
of the answer-can be found in neoclassical price theory, the economic 
framework that dominated the subject of industrial organization and 
thus informed antitrust doctrine for several decades beginning in about 
1940.31 Indeed, from 1940 into the 1980s, industrial organization was 
27 See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 295 (explaining that Standard sold 
6.8% of the market's total gallonage through company-owned stations). 
28 See Steven N.J. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1983). 
29 See United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (the Sherman Act 
does not interfere with the long-recognized right of a trader to refuse to deal 
with others absent a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly). 
30 See nn.81-82, infra and accompanying text. 
31 See Meese, supra note 21, at 119-34 (explaining how price-theoretic 
industrial organization influenced antitrust law and scholarship during this 
period). 
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basically applied price theory.32 Moreover, as explained later in this arti-
cle, certain aspects of current law's approach to exclusive dealing 
arrangements still reflect the influence of price theory's outmoded 
approach to industrial organization and nonstandard contracting.33 
Price theory had a straightforward agenda: an analysis of the 
extent to which private markets could, through the price system, pro-
duce an optimal allocation of resources without state intervention.34 
The basic building block of price theory was the model of perfect 
competition, a hypothetical world in which innumerable firms cost-
lessly sold homogeneous products to perfectly informed consumers.35 
Because knowledge flowed freely, fraud and opportunism did not 
32 See R. H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 
POUCY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61-64 (L. 
Fuchs ed., 1972) (surveying industrial organization textbooks of the period by 
Joe Bain and George Stigler and concluding that "essentially, [both authors] 
consider the subject of industrial organization as applied price theory"); 
GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 1 (1968) (portraying industrial 
organization as "price or resource allocation theory"); JoE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 25-27 (1968) (same). See also RICHARD CAvEs, AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 14 (1967) ("The subject of 
'industrial organization' applies the economist's models of price theory to the 
industries in the world around us."). 
33 See nn.181-245, infra and accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., A. C. PIGOU, THE EcoNOMics OF WELFARE 127-30 (1932) 
(describing his project in this manner). Of course, all price theory assumed 
the sort of state intervention necessary to define property rights, enforce 
contracts, and protect market participants from fraud, theft, and similar 
wrongs. See id. (describing his project as involving analysis of the outcome of 
the "free play of self-interest" within a given legal framework); id. at xii 
(summarizing part II of the work entitled: The Size of the National Dividend and 
the Distribution of Resources Among Different Uses as "[ascertaining] how far the 
free play of self-interest, acting under the existing legal system, tends to 
distribute the country's resources in the way most favorable to the 
production of a large national dividend."). 
35 See JOE BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT 95-135 (1948); 
George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated, 65 J. PoL. EcoN. 
1 (1957) (detailing antecedents and development of perfect competition 
model); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 76-86 (1921) 
(detailing various assumptions of the perfect competition model). See also F. 
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exist in this world.36 Within this model, the firm performed two 
related functions: allocational and technological.37 All firms faced a 
given production function-a mathematical representation of the 
relationship between inputs and outputs.38 This mathematical func-
tion was a given, that is, exogenous to the firm, determined as it was 
by engineering and scientific considerations.39 With full knowledge of 
A. Hayek, Meaning of Competition, in F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUAUSM AND EcoNOMIC 
ORDER 94 (1948) (asserting that most assumptions of the perfect competition 
model "are equally assumed in the discussion of the various 'imperfect' or 
'monopolistic' markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic 
'perfections."'); Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and 
the Passage of Time, in CoASEAN EcoNOMICS: LAw AND EcoNOMICS AND THE NEw 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 2 (Steven Medema ed., 1998) (noting that Joan 
Robinson and Edward Chamberlin, who pioneered the theory of oligopoly, 
relied upon various assumptions of the perfect competition model). See also 
CARL KAYSEN & DoNALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST Poucv 7 (1959) ("the rigorous 
model of the perfectly competitive market is the appropriate starting point of 
any definition [of competition relevant to antitrust policy]."); id. at 8 ("though 
the model of [perfectly] competitive market structure is not usable as such in 
our definition of competition, other concepts of the model are."). 
36 See KNIGHT, supra note 35, at 78-79 (explaining that perfect competition 
model "formally exclude[s] all preying of individuals upon each other ... [it] 
exclude[s] fraud or deceit and theft or brigandidge."); id. at 78 (stating that 
such exclusion was implicit in the assumption of rationality and perfect 
information). 
37 See Meese, supra note 12, at 39-44. 
38 See KELVIN LANCASTER, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 88 (1974) ("A general 
statement of all outputs that can be obtained by all efficient input 
combinations is called the production function."). 
39 See id. at 71-76 (nature of available production processes determined 
by technology); TIBOR SciTOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 113 (1948) ("The 
production function represents the scope and limitations of production as 
determined by technical conditions, which the economist cannot change and 
must be accepted as a given."), id. at 113-21; GEORGE J. STIGLER, THEORY OF 
CoMPETITIVE PRICE, 109-10 (1942) ("Production functions are descriptive of 
techniques or systems of organization of productive services, and they are 
therefore taken from disciplines such as engineering and industrial 
chemistry: to the economic theorist they are data of analysis."), id. at 109-15; 
Oliver E. Williamson, Technology and Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. EcoN. 
REv. & 0RG. 355 (1988). 
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this function, the firm in perfect competition examined the price of 
inputs in the market, examined the price that its final product could 
command, and then set its output and mix of inputs accordingly.40 In 
short, the firm of perfect competition was essentially a resource-
allocating calculation machine.41 
Perfect competition's functional portrayal of the firm implied a 
certain theory of firm scope, that is, an explanation for the extent of 
complete vertical integration and thus the boundaries of firms. In 
short, the perfect competition model implied that the firm's bound-
aries would be determined by the same sort of engineering considera-
tions that determined the exact content of the firm's production 
function. 42 The paradigmatic example of such technologically-deter-
mined integration involved the combination within a single firm of 
iron production and steel production. By integrating these functions, 
it was said, a single firm could avoid the necessity of reheating iron 
40 See FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT CoMPETITION AND rnE TRANSFORMATION 
OF EcoNOMICS 16 (1995) (explaining that, under price theory's model of perfect 
competition, "the only acceptable behavior of firms is to mechanically 
reallocate capital in response to a new set of perfect information emissions-
provided like manna from heaven, indiscriminately and simultaneously-to 
the roboticized helmsmen of each firm"); RoNALD H. CoASE, THE FIRM, rnE 
MARKET, AND 1HE LAw 3 (1992) ("The firm to an economist ... is 'effectively 
defined as a cost curve and a demand curve, and the theory [of the firm] is 
simply the logic of optimal pricing and input combination."'), quoting Mark 
Slater, Foreword to Eorm PENROSE, THE THEORY OF rnE GRowrn OF 1HE FIRM ix 
(2d ed. 1980); ScrrovsKY, supra note 39, at 109-42 (describing behavior of "the 
firm" in this manner); BAIN, supra note 35, at 10 (same). 
41 See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. EcoN. & 
0RG. 141, 143 (1988) ("A firm in the theory of price is simply a rhetorical 
device adopted to facilitate discussion of the price mechanism."); Harold 
Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 
375, 377 (1983) ("It is a mistake to confuse the firm of economic theory with 
its real-world namesake. The chief mission of neoclassical economics [i.e., 
price theory] is to understand how the price system coordinates the use of 
resources, not to understand the inner workings of real firms."). See also 
MACHOVEC, supra note 40, at 16. 
42 See nn.38-39, supra and accompanying text (explaining how 
engineering and scientific considerations explained the firm's production 
function). 
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ingot before transforming that ingot into steel, thus avoiding the 
additional energy and labor costs that such reheating entailed.43 
Numerous textbooks of the era employed this example to illustrate 
the technological origins for complete integration.44 
Of course, price theory recognized some departures from the 
assumptions of the perfect competition model. Most notably, price 
theorists recognized the existence of economies of scale and product 
differentiation. The existence of economies of scale implied that, in 
some industries, firms would have to attain a certain scale to mini-
mize their costs and thus the social costs of producing a given level of 
output.45 This result, in tum, implied a violation of perfect competi-
tion's numerosity assumption-at least in some industries.46 At the 
same time, product differentiation implied a violation of perfect com-
petition's assumption that all products produced and sold in a partie-
43 See BAIN, supra note 32, at 381 ("Economies of integration generally 
involve a physical or technical integration of the processes in a single plant. A 
classic case is that of integrating iron-making and steel-making to effect a 
saving in fuel costs by eliminating a reheating of the iron before it is fed to a 
steel furnace."). 
44 See F.M. ScHERER, INDuSTRIAL STRuCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 70 
(1970); BAIN, supra note 32, at 381 (1968); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 35, at 
120; JoEL DIRLAM & ALFRED KAHN, FAIR CoMPETITION: THE LAw AND EcoNOMICS oF 
ANTITRUST PouCY 23 (1954); GEORGE STOCKING & MYRoN WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND 
FREE ENTERPRISE 64-65 (1951). 
45 See BAIN, supra note 35, at 84 (stating that, "in most industries, a small 
firm is quiet inefficient"); id. at 153 (concluding that comparison of output 
levels in monopolized and competitive industries is "idle" because 
monopolized industries often realize economies of scale and thus may 
produce more output than a competitive industry). 
46 See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 44, at 53--61, 108; id. at 13 ("Pure 
competition can scarcely be realized in a machine age."); DIRLAM & KAHN, 
supra note 44, at 33 ("Rarely does the cause of effective competition demand 
an attack on an industry because of the fewness of the firms that make it 
up."); Edward Mason, Workable Competition Versus Workable Monopoly, in 
EDWARD MAsoN, EcoNOMIC CoNCENTRATION AND THE MoNOPOLY PROBLEM 387 
(1957) ("Some power there has to be, both because of the inescapable 
limitations of the process of atomization and because power is needed to do 
the job the American public expects of its industrial machine."). 
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ular market are homogeneous.47 Both departures, then, implied that at 
least some firms in some industries would possess market power, 
thus resulting in a distortion of the allocation of resources from that 
which perfectly functioning markets would produce.48 Nonetheless, 
scholars of the era recognized that such departures were quite often 
beneficial on balance, because they produced benefits in the form of 
lower costs or the satisfaction of consumer preferences, benefits that 
often outweighed any resulting harm.49 In so doing, scholars seemed 
to employ an implicit version of the partial equilibrium tradeoff 
model that professor Williamson would apply to mergers in 1968.50 
47 See EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
(1933); FRANK H. KNIGHT, Demand and Supply Price, in THE EcoNOMIC 
ORGANIZATION, 67, 90-92 (1933). 
48 See PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 495-97 
(1951); BAIN, supra note 35, at 242-47 (concluding that monopolistic 
competition created by product differentiation confers a relatively small 
degree of market power on firms producing such products); CHAMBERLIN, 
supra note 47; KNIGHT, supra note 47, at 67, 90-92. 
49 See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 35, at 58 ("We would therefore make 
no direct attempt to eliminate market power derived from economies of scale, 
valid patents, or the introduction of new processes, products, or marketing 
techniques."); STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 44, at 53--61, 108; id. at 13 ("Pure 
competition can scarcely be realized in a machine age."); DIRLAM & KAHN, supra 
note 44, at 33 ("Rarely does the cause of effective competition demand an 
attack on an industry because of the fewness of the firms that make it up."); 
Mason, supra note 46, at 387 ("Some power there has to be, both because of the 
inescapable limitations of the process of atomization and because power is 
needed to do the job the American public expects of its industrial machine."); 
JoHN P. MILLER, UNFAIR CoMPETITION 411 (1941) ("It would not be feasible to 
pulverize industry sufficiently to approximate pure competition" because 
doing so would "interfere [ ] with the attainment of the optimal scale of plant 
and rate of operation."). See also BAIN, supra note 35, at 242-47 (concluding that 
monopolistic competition created by product differentiation confers a 
relatively small degree of market power on firms producing such products). 
50 Compare Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The 
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18 (1968) (nontrivial efficiencies will 
outweigh allocative losses produced by merger to monopoly) with KAYSEN & 
TURNER, supra note 35, at 139-40 (proof of substantial economies should justify a 
merger). It should be noted that these scholars would not have required proof 
that the economies reduced prices. See nn.267-68, infra and accompanying text. 
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While scholars recognized these two departures from perfect com-
petition, they generally embraced that model's other assumptions, 
including the assumption that firms could bargain costlessly and the 
assumption that actual or threatened opportunism would not impact 
economic activity.s1 At the same time, neither of the recognized depar-
tures suggested any change in the theory of the firm implied by the 
perfect competition model.S2 After all, both the realization of 
economies of scale and product differentiation took place within a sin-
gle firm and were entirely consistent with the allocative and techno-
logical function that perfect competition ascribed to firms.s3 If 
anything, these modifications suggested an additional possible ratio-
nale for complete vertical integration, namely, the acquisition or main-
tenance of market power.54 Indeed, some price theorists expressly 
opined that any vertical integration that was not the result of techno-
logical efficiencies was presumptively anticompetitive.ss 
51 See Hayek, supra note 35, at 94; KNIGHT, supra note 35, at 10-11 
(describing "evil results" that flow from failure of economists to recognize 
real world departures from various assumptions of the perfect competition 
model); Langlois, supra note 35, at 2. See also KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 35, 
at 7-8. While professors Turner and Kaysen recognized that the perfect 
competition model could not provide the final definition of competition 
relevant to antitrust policy, they nonetheless assumed that any practice that a 
firm would not adopt in a perfectly competitive market reflected an exercise 
of market power that had to be justified. Id. at 8. 
52 See nn.34-44, supra and accompanying text (describing theory of the 
firm that informed perfect competition model). 
53 See nn.37-41, supra and accompanying text. 
54 See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 35, at 120 ("[V]ertical integration may 
also exist in situations where it offers no social gains, and is related to the 
achievement, maintenance, spread, or exploitation of market power"). 
55 See BAIN, supra note 32, at 381 (''The trained observer tends to form a 
considerable suspicion from casual observation that there is a good deal of 
vertical integration which, although not actually uneconomical, is also not 
justified on the basis of any cost savings. This is apparently true in particular 
of the integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing firms. In most 
cases the rationale of the integration is evidently the increase of market 
power of the firms rather than a reduction in cost."). See also KAYSEN & 
TuRNER, supra note 35, at 120-23 (listing three rationales for vertical 
integration: technical efficiencies, (unspecified) planning and marketing 
economies, and the achievement or protection of market power). 
EXCLUSIVE DEALING 387 
By recognizing just two departures from perfect competition 
and embracing that model's theory of the firm, economists practic-
ing price theory produced the model of "workable competition."56 
While perfect competition had simply treated firms as price takers, 
the workable competition model recognized and applauded two 
other forms of beneficial firm conduct. First, firms could realize 
technological efficiencies, by expanding output to take advantage 
of a given production function or innovating so as to alter that 
function in its favor.57 Second, a firm could attempt to differentiate 
its products, thereby appealing to the preferences of a particular 
subset of consumers. 58 Both such activities-which took place 
entirely within completely integrated firms-were treated as com-
mendable "competition on the merits," likely to enhance social 
welfare. 59 
At the same time, price theory's workable competition model 
recognized no beneficial purposes for so-called nonstandard con-
tracts, including exclusive dealing. Such agreements reached 
beyond the firm and influenced the conduct of distinct economic 
entities-suppliers or customers-at a time when the firm "impos-
ing" the agreement did not hold title to the product it produced 
and sold. As a result, such agreements could not produce techno-
logical benefits, which by their nature arose within the firm. 60 
56 See J. M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 241 (1940). See also Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory 
of the Firm, 85 MiNN. L. REv. 743, 772-93 (2005) (describing development of the 
workable competition model). 
57 See I<AYSEN & TURNER, supra note 35, at 83-86 (treating entrepreneurial 
innovation and related technological progress as an unalloyed good); BAIN, 
supra note 35, at 84-87 (treating realization of economies of scale as a benefit). 
58 See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 35, at 15-16. 
59 See Meese, supra note 21, at 119-23 (describing price theory's vision of 
merits-based competition). 
60 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the 
Antitrust I.nws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1950); MILLER, supra note 49, at 199; W. 
Arthur Lewis, Notes on the Economics of Loyalty, 9 EcoNOMICA 333 (1942); 
W.H.S. STEVENS, UNFAIR CoMPETITION, 75 (1917) (tying contracts are necessarily 
expressions of monopoly power); id. at 90-91 (exclusive dealing contracts are 
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Firms obtained such agreements, it was said, by wielding market 
power.61 
Price theory and its workable competition model quite naturally 
produced the so-called inhospitality tradition of antitrust law. Under 
this approach, courts condemned any number of nonstandard con-
tracts, including tying agreements, minimum resale price mainte-
nance, and exclusive territories.62 Such agreements, courts said, were 
imposed on dealers and consumers by means of market power.63 By 
contrast, analogous activity that took place within individual firms 
was deemed lawful per se.64 
Oddly, some workable competition theorists recognized that de 
facto exclusive dealing could produce benefits.6s For instance, schol-
necessarily result of economic power). See also MYRoN WATKINS, PUBuc REGULATION 
OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BuSINESS ENTERPRisES 220-25 (1940) (tying contracts are 
necessarily the result of market power, but not always anticompetitive). See also 
WilliamS. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and 
Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1436 (1968) (arguing that contractual 
integration cannot produce efficiencies); nn.37-41, supra and accompanying text 
(explaining price theory's technological conception of the firm). 
61 See Turner, supra note 60, at 60--64 (firms could only obtain agreement to 
tying contracts by exercising market power); Mn.LER, supra note 49, at 199 (same). 
62 See Meese, supra note 21, at 124-34 (describing so-called inhospitality 
tradition inspired by price theory). Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in 
Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 715 (1982) (describing so-called 
inhospitality tradition, which "called for courts to strike down business 
practices that were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradition, an inference 
of monopolization followed from the courts' inability to grasp how a practice 
might be consistent with substantial competition."). 
63 See Standard Stations, supra note 15, at 306 (seller can only obtain 
agreement to tying contract by exercising market power); William H. Page, 
Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1 (1995) 
(explaining how legal realism's concept of "coercion" influenced antitrust 
doctrine during this period). 
64 Meese, supra note 56, at 797-807 (describing law of this era). But see 
Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211,213 (1951) (finding that 
maximum resale price agreement between two wholly owned subsidiaries 
was unlawful concerted action under section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
65 See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 44, at 183-85. See also l<AYSEN & TURNER, 
supra note 35, at 159-60. 
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ars noted that confining a dealer to one supplier could reduce the cost 
of ordering and delivering the manufacturer's product.66 Scholars also 
conceded that close cooperation between manufacturers and exclu-
sive dealers had often produced improvements in the products sold 
to the ultimate consumer.67 Finally, scholars also noted that the 
prospect of exclusive dealing could enhance manufacturers' incen-
tives to help develop additional retail outlets.68 
However, scholars generally believed that the prospect of such 
benefits could not justify a charitable attitude toward such agree-
ments. For instance, while exclusivity might encourage investment in 
the creation of new dealerships, such encouragement was said to 
depend upon the prospect of the manufacturer obtaining market 
power.69 Moreover, some scholars claimed that firms could realize 
other such benefits without demanding contractual exclusivity. If 
exclusivity really did produce such benefits, it was said, parties-
such as dealers or other input suppliers-would embrace such exclu-
sivity voluntarily, that is, without any contractual requirement 
mandating such exclusivity.7o In modern parlance, scholars believed 
66 See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 44, at 184-86. 
67 See id., at 183--84 (conceding that "to protect the goodwill associated with 
their brands, [oil companies] have induced, cajoled, bribed, and forced dealers 
to maintain clean rest rooms and provide motorists with many other services."). 
68 See id., at 183. Other descriptions of the benefits of such agreements 
were so vague as to be useless. See I<AYSEN & TURNER, supra note 35, at 160 
("Economic justifications can be given for exclusive dealing contracts. They 
may contribute to the creation and effectiveness of distribution outlets 
[how?]; in some cases, dealer loyalty to a particular seller's product may 
contribute to the vigor of competition [how?]-but only provided that the 
exclusive arrangements do not impede competitors' access to the ultimate 
consuming market."). 
69 See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 44, at 183. 
70 See Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive 
Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 S. CT. REv. 267, 307-308 ("If a strong 
and legitimate business need for exclusive selling actually does exist, it is 
strange that dealers will not follow this policy without being compelled to 
do so by contract, for the advantages that result should benefit them as well 
as the firms from which they buy. Perhaps an occasional dealer will be too 
inept or short sighted to perceive his best interests, but such men could 
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there to be "less restrictive means" -that is, reliance upon the market 
or "best efforts" obligations, for achieving the same benefits as exclu-
sive arrangements.71 Given the prospect of such alternatives, exclu-
sive dealing agreements were to these scholars all harm and no 
benefit. Manufacturers who obtained them did so by exercising mar-
ket power to coerce their trading partners.72 
Given these conclusions of economic science, it is no surprise 
that courts were hostile toward exclusive dealing arrangements 
during this era.73 If anything, it may have seemed that courts were 
not quite hostile enough! There was really no reason to analyze 
such restraints on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason.74 
Instead, exclusive dealing contracts basically met the test for per se 
presumably be replaced for demonstrable inefficiency without resorting to 
the widespread use of restrictive contracts."); DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 44, 
at 185 ("It is difficult to see why many of the mutual benefits and socially 
beneficial consequences of exclusive dealing require coercion [i.e., contractual 
requirement] for their achievement."). 
71 See also Meese, supra note 21, at 110-13 (describing the role of 
purported less restrictive alternatives under rule of reason analysis). 
72 See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 44, at 185 (characterizing exclusive 
dealing contracts as instances of coercion); MILLER, supra note 49, at 210 
("Exclusive dealing arrangements ... are useful only in markets where there 
are some elements of monopoly control in the manufacture of the product."); 
BAIN, supra note 32, at 364 (concluding that concentrated "market structure ... 
is to some extent created by conduct, although the conduct in question 
generally is feasible because of certain basic environmental and structural 
characteristics of industries that various sellers can exploit to their 
advantage"); STEVENS, supra note 60, at 90-91(exclusive dealing contracts are 
necessarily the result of economic power). 
73 To be sure, scholars did not advocate a per se ban on such agreements, 
choosing instead to advocate case-by-case analysis. See, e.g., I<AYSEN & TUR."lER, 
supra note 35, at 160 (agreements that foreclosed a significant share of dealing 
capacity should be unlawful regardless of benefits); DIRLAM & KAHN, supra 
note 44, at 198-99. However, the economic logic of these scholars' hostility 
toward agreements that did result in nontrivial foreclosure would seem to 
have required a per se ban on such agreements. 
74 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (holding that 
courts should analyze most if not all restraints under a fact-intensive rule of 
reason). 
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illegality applied by the courts under section 1 of the Sherman 
ActJS They were "always or almost always" anticompetitive in the 
sense that they restrained rivalry that would otherwise occur 
between rival products within particular dealerships, for 
instance.76 At the same time, such agreements produced no 
redeeming virtues that parties could not realize in some other 
way.77 As a result, it seemed clear that they were designed to pro-
tect or acquire monopoly power.78 Given the absence of benefits, 
there would have seemed to be no other possible explanation: why 
else would firms expend resources negotiating and enforcing 
them?79 If anything, then, courts were too charitable to such agree-
ments, given the economic theory of the time, requiring, as they 
75 See Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) 
(articulating two-part test for determining whether a contract is per se 
unlawful). 
76 To take a simple example, a requirement that Ford dealers sell only 
Ford cars would prevent competition between Ford and Chevrolet 
automobiles in that particular dealership and thus be "anticompetitive" as 
courts still define this term for purposes of per se analysis, without regard to 
the amount of commerce involved. See generally Meese, supra note 21, at 95-96 
(explaining that courts treat any restriction on rivalry as anticompetitive for 
purposes of per se analysis). In the same way, of course, horizontal price 
fixing is anticompetitive in this sense without regard to the market position of 
the parties to the agreement. 
77 See Northern Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. at 5 (absence of redeeming virtues a 
necessary condition for per se illegality); Standard Station, supra note 15, at 
313-14 ("If in fact it is economically desirable for service stations to confine 
themselves to the sale of the petroleum products of a single supplier, they 
will continue to do so though not bound by contract."). See also Meese, supra 
note 21, at 96-98 (explaining that application or not of the per se rule usually 
depends upon possible presence or not of "redeeming virtues," given breadth 
with which court defines "anticompetitive"). 
78 BAIN, supra note 32, at 363-65 (concluding that various nonstandard 
agreements including exclusive dealing simply fortified preexisting market 
power). 
79 See Meese, supra note 21, at 98 (explaining why absence of any 
purported justification for restriction on rivalry suggests that the parties to 
the restraint are attempting to exercise market power). 
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did, a showing that such restrictions foreclosed a nontrivial share 
of the market before condemning them. so 
By contrast, exclusive arrangements that applied only within a 
single firm were either lawful per se or subject to the relatively lax 
standards of section 2. Section 2, of course, applied only in those rare 
instances in which the firm had a monopoly, or a dangerous probabil-
ity of achieving one.81 Such a threshold-showing was not easy to 
make. While courts enforcing section 1 equated "market power" with 
product differentiation, they required more when searching for 
monopoly power.sz 
III. PRICE THEORY UNDONE AND A NEW THEORY 
OF THE FIRM 
This is how things stood around 1965, when price theory and the 
inhospitality tradition came under attack from two different direc-
tions. First, led by Robert Bork, the so-called Chicago school of 
antitrust itself ironically invoked what it called "basic price theory" to 
argue that most nonstandard agreements were beneficial or harmless 
and should therefore survive scrutiny under the antitrust laws.83 
80 As noted earlier, the FTC was not so charitable. See nn.23-25, supra 
and accompanying text (detailing FTC challenges to exclusive dealing 
arrangements that impacted a de minimis amount of commerce). 
81 See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. 
Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (actual monopolization); Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
82 See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,393 
(1955) ("[The] power that, let us say, automobile or soft drink manufacturers 
have over their trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal 
monopoly."). Cf. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-48 (1963) 
(possession of a copyright creates presumption of economic power); United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (same); Siegel v. Chicken 
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51-52 (9th Cir. 1971) (trademark that differentiates 
product in eyes of consumers creates presumption of market power). 
83 The ultimate expression of this position can be found in RoBERT H. 
BoRK, THE ANrrrRusT PARADOX (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter Antitrust Paradox]. See, 
e.g., id. at 116-33 (arguing that courts should rely upon price theory to 
analyze antitrust problems); id. at 299-309 (arguing that exclusive dealing 
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Most famously, Bork and other Chicago schoolers argued that intra-
brand restraints like minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) and 
exclusive territories could not harm consumers and were likely means 
of overcoming failures in the market for distributional services.84 
At the same time, however, Bork and others also defended other 
nonstandard agreements of an interbrand nature, such as tying and 
exclusive dealing. Bork and other Chicago schoolers did not, it should 
be noted, question price theory's account of the firm or dwell upon 
any supposed benefits of such agreements.ss In this way their defense 
differed from their defense of, say, minimum RPM, to which they 
ascribed significant benefits.86 
Instead, the Chicago school relied almost entirely on the claim that 
such interbrand agreements could not produce anticompetitive harm in 
contracts cannot be anticompetitive); id. at 365-81 (arguing that tying contracts 
cannot produce competitive harm); id. at 280-98 (arguing that minimum resale 
price maintenance is generally beneficial). The initial manuscript of this work 
was complete in 1969, see id. at xv, and the arguments therein tracked 
arguments Bork had previously made in a series of law review articles. See, 
e.g., Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 
950 (1968); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price 
Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) [hereinafter Price Fixing and 
Market Division]; Robert H. Bork & Ward Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 J. 
CowM. L. REv. 363 (1965). See also RICHARD A. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN 
EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Aaron Director & Edward Levi, Law and the 
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281 (1956). 
84 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Divisions, supra note 83, at 429--65. See 
also PosNER, supra note 83, at 147--67; Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers 
Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1962). 
85 Cf. Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the 
Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. CoMP. L. & EcoN. 21, 
52-54 (2005) (explaining how Robert Bork invoked Coase's theory of the firm 
to support his claim that minimum RPM and exclusive territories could 
facilitate distribution). 
86 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division, supra note 83, at 453; see also 
id. at 430-38 (attributing similar efficiencies to exclusive territories); PosNER, 
supra note 83, at 147--67; Telser, supra note 83, at 88-92 (describing benefits of 
such agreements). See also Meese, supra note 85, at 52-54 (explaining how 
Bork's account of minimum RPM and exclusive territories rested upon 
application of Ronald Coase's theory of the firm). 
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the first place. For one thing, Bork and others pointed out that such agree-
ments often arose in deconcentrated markets, in which proponents of the 
contracts possessed little if any market power or chance of attaining it.87 
Moreover, if a firm attempted to use these agreements to achieve such 
power, rivals could readily thwart such a strategy by offering dealers or 
other suppliers identical or superior terms.BB In particular, Bork and others 
argued that a firm that sought to impose agreements that enhanced such 
power would have to offer trading partners some inducement-usually a 
price discount-to convince them to accept them.89 Such discounts, Bork 
said, were simply competition, and nothing prevented a putative preda-
tor's rivals from offering the very same discounts and thus obtaining the 
very same exclusive agreements as the supposed predator.90 
What, though, of firms that already possessed such power? Could 
not such firms use these contracts to maintain or extend it?91 Not at 
87 See BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 302-{)3 (explaining that 
exclusive dealing in Brown Shoe decision could not possibly harm 
competition); PosNER, supra note 83, at 201-02 (contending that exclusive 
dealing could not produce harm in the Standard Stations case because 
agreements were of limited duration and entry into retail distribution of 
gasoline was relatively easy). 
88 See BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 304-05. 
89 Bork & Bowman, supra note 83, at 366-67. See also POSNER, supra note 
83, at 202-04; Director & Levi, supra note 83, at 290-91. 
90 See BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 304-307; Bork & Bowman, 
supra note 83, at 366-67 ("The theory of exclusionary tactics underlying the 
law appears to be that firm X, which already has ten percent of the market, can 
sign up more than ten percent of the retailers, perhaps twenty percent, and, by 
thus 'foreclosing' rivals from retail outlets, obtain a larger share of the market. 
But one must then ask why so many retailers are willing to limit themselves to 
selling X's product. Why do not ninety percent of them turn to X's rivals? 
Because X has greater market acceptance? But then X's share of the market 
would grow for that reason and the requirements contracts have nothing to do 
with it. Because X offers them some extra inducement? But that sounds like 
competition. It is equivalent to a price cut, and surely X's competitors can be 
relied upon to meet competition."). See also POSNER, supra note 83, at 202-05 
(concluding after similar analysis that anticompetitive impact of such 
restraints is "unlikely" and that efficiency explanation is "more plausible"). 
91 See nn.62-80, supra and accompanying text. 
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all, Chicagoans said. A firm with such power would presumably 
exercise it by charging what the market would bear for its product.92 
Any effort to charge a monopoly price and impose exclusive dealing 
would thus require a firm to reduce its price below the level that 
would otherwise maximize profits.93 Such discounts would exactly 
offset any enhanced market power that such agreements could sup-
posedly produce.94 Thus, it was said, even firms with market power 
could not gain from imposing such agreements. 
If firms could not use such agreements to enhance their gains from 
market power, Chicagoans said, the contracts must produce benefits.95 
Still, the Chicago school offered almost no argument or evidence for 
what such benefits might be.96 Instead, Chicagoans basically inferred 
the existence of such benefits from the lack of any anticompetitive 
harm. After all, it was said, if firms expended resources negotiating 
and enforcing such agreements, without any prospect of harming con-
sumers, then they must be attempting at least to minimize their costs 
so as to better compete with rivals.97 The sole exception was Judge 
92 
93 
See BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 306. 
See id. 
94 See id. at 304-05; PoSNER, supra note 83, at 202-05 (explaining how 
price cuts necessary to "impose" exclusive dealing would dissipate any 
monopoly profits that manufacturers might otherwise earn due to such 
agreements). It should be noted that Judge Posner added the additional 
argument that dealers who believed that such a predatory strategy was afoot 
would resist it, by demanding even more compensation before they agreed to 
exclusivity). See POSNER, supra note 83, at 203-04. 
95 See BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 304-05 (contending that 
such agreements cannot harm competition and thus "must" create 
efficiencies). Ironically, then-professor Posner's discussion of exclusive 
dealing did offer an efficiency rationale for lease-only policies. See PosNER, 
supra note 83, at 204. However, that rationale-the optimal pricing of durable 
goods sold by a monopolist-did not apply to exclusive dealing contracts. 
96 BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 305 (noting that a different 
scholar "cites a variety of efficiencies that such contracts may create" without 
mentioning what those might be) (citing PHILUP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: 
PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES 635 (2d ed., 1974)). 
97 See id. at 304 ("It is important to see that Alpha [the manufacturer 
that obtains an exclusive dealing contract] must offer something 
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Bork's passing endorsement of professor Areeda's claim that such 
agreements can help manufacturers "obtain the special selling effort of 
the outlet."98 Subsequent scholarship called this argument into ques-
tion.99 Similar logic would drive Chicagoans to draw an inference of 
benefits where other restraints were concerned as well.10° 
At about the same time a distinct critique of the inhospitality tra-
dition arose in the form of TCE. Unlike the Chicago school, which 
worked within price theory and asserted that exclusionary agree-
ments could not produce competitive harm, TCE offered a critique of 
price theory and focused on the propensity of nonstandard agree-
ments to produce competitive benefits.1o1 Moreover, and importantly 
to the food canners to get them to sign the requirements contracts, and that it 
must offer that something for the life of the contract, which means that, in 
terms of cutting out rivals, the contract offers Alpha no advantages it would 
not have had without the contract. The advantage of the contract must be the 
creation of efficiency .... In this situation, efficiencies are the reality, and the 
fear of foreclosure is chimerical."). 
98 See id. at 307 (contending that absence of competitive harm in Standard 
Stations suggests that Standard Oil employed the contracts to ensure optimal 
selling efforts by dealers) (citing AREEDA, supra note 96, at 635). 
99 See Howard Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 6 (arguing 
that exclusive dealing contracts cannot ensure selling effort by dealers). 
100 See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 U.S. 210, 
216-21 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that defendants did not possess sufficient 
market power to impose competitive harm); id. at 221 (Bork, J.) ("If it is clear 
that [the defendants] by eliminating competition among themselves are not 
attempting to restrict industry output, then their agreement must be designed 
to make the conduct of their business more effective. No third possibility 
suggests itself."); BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 205 (contending 
that a trend toward concentration in a yet unconcentrated market "indicates 
that there are emerging efficiencies of economies of scale"). 
101 It should be noted that certain Chicago school critiques, while 
purportedly based upon price theory, were in fact protoapplications of 
transaction cost economics. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: 
A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REv. 143, 166-70 (1997) (explaining how 
Chicago account of vertical intrabrand distribution restraints was based upon 
TCE and not "price theory" as Bork and Posner claimed). At the same time, 
Chicago's analysis of exclusive dealing contracts rested solely on the claim that 
such agreements could not produce harm in the first place and not upon any 
affirmative assertion of what. benefits these restraints might produce. 
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for reasons to which I will return below, TCE's account of the benefits 
of such agreements did not depend upon the existence or possession 
of market power.1o2 
TCE produced a new theory of why firms exist in the first place, a 
theory that would also help explain exclusive dealing contracts and 
other nonstandard agreements.103 Most basically, TCE opined that nei-
ther technology nor allocation could explain the existence of firms or 
the boundaries between the firm and the market. Absent bargaining 
and information costs, the market-repeated transactions between 
individuals-could allocate resources without the intervention of 
firms.104 Moreover, technological considerations could certainly explain 
how individuals chose to organize various production processes and 
where they chose to locate them. These considerations could not, how-
ever, explain who should own or operate the various components of 
any given process.105 For instance, engineering considerations could 
compel individuals to locate iron ingot production in close proximity to 
102 See nn.135-42 infra and accompanying text (explaining how benefits of 
nonstandard agreements need not coexist with market power or other 
manifestations of anticompetitive harm). 
103 This article relies upon the conventional account of the revolution 
in economic theory known as transaction cost economics. In other work 
I have supplemented that account. See Meese, supra note 85, at 47-54 
(contending that some scholars explained how nonstandard contracts 
overcome market failure without questioning price theory's theory of the 
firm). 
104 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386, 388 (1937) 
[hereinafter Nature of the Finn] ("Having regard to the fact that if production 
is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any 
organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?"). See 
also Ronald H. Coase, Nature of the Finn Influence, 4 J.L. EcoN. & ORe. 33, 38 
(1988) ("Let us start by assuming that we have an economic system without 
firms, difficult though it may be to conceive of such a thing. All transactions 
are carried out as a result of contracts between factors, with the services to be 
provided to each other as specified in the contract without any direction 
involved .... In such a system the allocation of resources would respond 
directly to the structure of prices."). 
105 See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 83-84 (1975) 
(contending that technological consideration cannot explain vertical 
integration in the steel industry). 
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steel manufacturer, to eliminate the cost of reheating the ingot before it 
is rolled into steel.106 Nonetheless, such considerations could not estab-
lish or even suggest any particular pattern of ownership or control of 
the operations and their associated assets and employees.107 After all, 
the two factories could locate right next door to each other-even 
under the same roof-and yet still remain separately owned.1os Some-
thing besides "technology," then, would have to explain the existence 
of firms and the decision to bring potentially separable activities within 
the boundaries of a single entity. 
That something, it turned out, was found in the concept of trans-
action costs, that is, the cost of relying upon unbridled markets to 
conduct economic activity that could otherwise be performed within 
the firm.lo9 The prospect of these costs could induce individuals to 
combine technologically separable activities within the management 
of a single firm. 110 Under this view, the firm was simply a particular 
form of nonstandard contract, well-suited to minimizing transaction 
costs.111 Absent such costs, it was said, individuals could leave such 
106 See id. at 83 (noting that technological considerations could in fact 
explain the location of particular assets). 
107 See Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transaction Costs, and the 
New Institutionalism, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS AND WELFARE 
395, 396-97 (George R. Fiemel ed., 1985) (arguing that technical economies can 
"be achieved equally well if the factors of production are owned by independent 
individuals"); WILLIAMSON, supra note 105, at 83--84 (explaining why technological 
considerations cannot explain vertical integration in the steel industry). 
1os See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 104, at 388 ("In a department 
store, the allocation of the different sections to the various locations in the 
building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result of 
competitive bidding for space. In the Lancashire cotton industry a weaver can 
rent power and shop room and can obtain looms and yam on credit."). 
109 See id. at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm 
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism); id. at 
390-91 (detailing concept of transaction costs). 
no See id. at 390. See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 9, at 89-90. 
111 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 104, at 391 (characterizing the 
firm as a single contract pursuant to which employee "agrees to obey the 
direction of an entrepreneur within certain limits"). See also Cheung, supra 
note 28, at 3-5 (explaining how Coase's insight rested upon assertion that 
firm is a particular form of contractual device). 
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activities in the hands of separate individuals, and firms would not 
exist.112 
The identification of transaction costs as the rationale for complete 
integration encouraged scholars to identify and categorize such costs. 
Professor Coase, the progenitor of TCE, had focused upon haggling 
and information costs-the costs of locating trading partners, discov-
ering relevant prices, and striking the necessary bargains.113 Others 
would subsequently focus on the costs of relational contracting that 
reliance on the market might entail. 114 In particular, Oliver 
Williamson and others identified the prospect of opportunism by 
trading partners as a cost of relying on the market-a cost that might 
lead parties to conduct activity under the aegis of a single firm.115 So, 
for instance, an iron foundry that located near a steel mill-but away 
from other potential customers-might place itself at risk of exploita-
tion by the mill, which could "hold up" the foundry by consistently 
renegotiating the terms of the relationship. 116 The chance that such 
separate ownership could result in this type of opportunism was just 
the sort of potential transaction cost that might lead to the complete 
vertical integration of iron and steel production.117 
TCE' s theory of the firm also suggested rationales for partial inte-
gration. After all, TCE concluded that "the firm" was just one of many 
nonstandard contracts.118 Moreover, the firm itself was not a perfect 
112 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 104, at 388. See also Cheung, 
supra note 28, at 4 (explaining how, in the absence of transaction costs, "a 
customer buying a part would make a separate payment to each of the many 
contributing to its production"). 
113 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 104, at 390-91. 
114 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981). 
11s See WILUAMSON, supra note 9, at 30-32, 44-49. 
116 See id., at 8&-89; WILLIAMSON, supra note 105, at 83-84. See also Klein, 
Crawford & Alchian, supra note 9, at 298-302 (explaining how owner of 
printing press could suffer opportunism at hands of publisher absent assured 
purchases by latter). 
117 See WILUAMSON, supra note 9, at 86-89; WILLIAMSON, supra note 105, at 
83-84. 
118 See nn.109-12, supra and accompanying text. 
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institution: sometimes reliance upon this institution came with costs 
of its own. 119 Thus, practitioners of TCE took their transaction cost-
based "theory of the firm" "on the road," using it to explain various 
forms of partial contractual integration that price theory had not been 
able to explain.tzo 
Exclusive dealing was no exception. Consider the case of a sup-
plier contemplating an investment in a specialized method of produc-
tion that is necessary to differentiate a product and serve a particular 
subset of consumers. It would be foolhardy for the supplier actually 
to make such an investment unless it could be assured that the poten-
tial customers would actually purchase the output of this specialized 
process.121 Of course, complete integration could bring such assur-
ance: a tire manufacturer that owned Ford could rest assured that its 
output would not go unsold, at least so long as consumers purchased 
Ford automobiles.122 At the same time, parties that hoped to avoid the 
119 See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as OrganiZiltiona/ Ownership, 4 J. 
L. EcoN. & ORG. 199, 204 (1988) (noting that complete vertical integration 
often involves "incentive-type costs"); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 
9, at 307 (complete vertical integration involves "ownership costs" that firms 
compare to transaction costs when choosing between long-term contracting 
and complete integration). Cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 114, at 1094-95 
(predicting that parties will adopt contracts governing their relationship that 
will induce them to replicate the behavior of a single, unified firm). 
120 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division, supra note 83, at 384 (relying 
upon Coase's work to contend that ancillary restraints are economically 
indistinguishable from cooperation that takes place within firrns); id. at 472 
("In economic analysis a contract integration is as much a firm as an 
ownership integration.") (citing Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 104); id. 
at 429-72 (explaining how intrabrand restraints can produce various 
benefits). See also Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" 
Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 356 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction 
Cost Approach, 127 U. PENN. L. REv. 953 (1979). Cf. Meese, supra note 85, at 
47-54 (contending that some scholars found beneficial purposes for 
nonstandard agreements without embracing new theory of the firm). 
121 Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, supra note 9, at 299-301. 
t22 See id. at 299-302 (vertical integration can overcome risk of opportunism 
directed at supplier who has made relationship-specific investments). See also 
Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher 
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downsides of complete integration could employ a less-drastic alter-
native: reliance upon the market coupled with an exclusive dealing 
contract.123 For instance, customers' promises of exclusivity could 
obviate fears that the buyers would take their business elsewhere-or 
threaten to do so-while at the same time retaining the various bene-
fits of reliance upon the market.124 Or, a supplier's promise to supply 
its entire output at a certain price could induce a customer to make 
investments specific to that output.125 In this way, such agreements 
could facilitate the sort of investment necessary to deepen specializa-
tion and enhance welfare.I26 
Other scholars-notably Howard Marvel-explained that exclu-
sive dealing could overcome interbrand positive externalities that 
could result from opportunistic behavior by dealers and rival manu-
facturers.127 Manufacturers that advertise their wares hope to drive 
Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J. L. EcoN. & ORe. 199, 204-06 
(1988) (explaining how backwards integration can overcome risk of 
opportunism by a supplier). 
123 See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 9, at 308-09 (explaining 
how exclusive dealing can give seller assurance necessary to induce specific 
investments); Milton Handler, Statement Before the Small Business 
Administration, 11 ANTITRUST BULL 417, 424-25 (1966) (same). See also n.131, 
infra (collecting cites suggesting that partial integration can be less costly than 
and superior to complete integration). 
124 See Handler, supra note 123, at 424-25 (contending that an exclusive 
buying provision can constitute "a vital quid pro quo to avoid placing the 
seller at the dealer's mercy''). 
125 Cf. Tampa Electric v. Nashville Coal, 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (evaluating 
contract whereby supplier committed its coal reserves to public utility that 
switched from oil to coal-burning generators). See also United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (explaining how 
contractual provision preventing employee from starting own business could 
facilitate investment in training). 
126 See Langlois, supra note 35, at 7-8, 11-14 (explaining how elimination 
of the threat of opportunism can encourage welfare-enhancing specific 
investment); Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, supra note 9, at 301 (where 
transactors face risk of opportunism, "less specific investments will be made 
to avoid being 'locked in"'). 
127 Marvel, supra note 99. 
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consumers to dealerships that carry them. Dealers, in tum, hope to 
attract consumers by displaying the manufacturer's trademark and 
advertising the manufacturer's products in local media. However, if 
these dealers also carry the products of rivals, consumers driven to 
the dealerships may, once there, purchase these rival products instead 
of those of the advertising manufacturer.128 Indeed, to the extent rival 
manufacturers do not advertise, they will be able to underprice those 
manufacturers who do, free riding on the latter's promotional expen-
ditures. As a result, dealers may even have incentives to "steer" cus-
tomers to rivals as a way to earn slightly larger margins.129 
Here again, manufacturers could avoid such opportunistic behav-
ior and the resulting market failure by integrating forward, taking on 
the distribution function themselves and thereby assuring that con-
sumers dealt only with company-owned dealers. In this way, they 
could essentially redefine their own property rights so as to capture 
the benefits of their promotional expenditures.130 At the same time, 
vertical integration can come with costs of its own, and exclusive deal-
ing could be a less drastic means of internalizing these externalities, by 
ensuring that dealers who display a manufacturer's trademark cannot 
then substitute rival products for those of the manufacturer whose 
advertising and investments popularized the mark in the first place.m 
128 See id. at 6-11 (explaining the propensity of manufacturers to free ride 
in this manner). 
129 In particular, dealers will presumably pay a lower price for the 
products manufactured by free-riding manufacturers than they pay for those 
made by the advertising firm. See id. at 7 (explaining that advertising 
manufacturers will include cost of advertising in price of product sold to 
dealers). To the extent consumers initially expect to purchase the higher-
priced, advertised product, the dealer may be able to convince them to 
purchase a rival product for a little less, but at a premium over the dealer's 
cost of the rival's product. See id. at 7. 
130 Cf. id. at 7-8 (characterizing exclusive dealing contracts as means of 
creating contractual property rights). 
131 Id. at 6-11. Cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 9, at 158-59 (explaining how 
partial integration can preserve high-powered incentives and thus be 
superior to complete integration); Klein, supra note 120, at 359 n.2 (explaining 
that franchisors may choose to rely on independent franchisees instead of 
employees because the former capture a portion of the benefits of their 
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It should be emphasized that the benefits of these agreements-
much like the benefits of property itself-depend critically upon con-
tractual exclusivity. No "less restrictive alternative" can plausibly 
further the same objective.132 If, for instance, an automobile manufac-
turer advertises its latest minivan to consumers, unfettered dealers 
could display the firm's trademark and carry its vans, thereby draw-
ing potential customers to its premises. Once there the customers 
could choose-or be steered to choose-a "knock off" competing 
brand.133 No "less restrictive alternative" could prevent such conduct 
or otherwise ensure that a manufacturer threatened by such free rid-
ing would engage in the optimal level of advertising.134 
efforts). See also Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 
CORNELL L. REv. 563, 595-98 (2004) (explaining why manufacturers may rely 
upon "the market" to distribute their goods). 
132 Cf. Meese, supra note 131, at 610-13 (explaining how purported "less 
restrictive alternatives" to intrabrand restraints like minimum RPM and 
exclusive territories cannot achieve the same objective as such restraints). See 
also nn.223-24, infra and accompanying text (detailing how less restrictive 
alternatives will not replicate benefits of exclusive dealing contracts). Of 
course, as noted in the text, a manufacturer could attempt to achieve the same 
objective by integrating forward and taking on the distribution function itself. 
However, as also noted above, such integration may come with costs of its 
own. Perhaps more importantly, such integration is actually more restrictive 
than an exclusive dealing contract, which must be renewed periodically. See, 
e.g., Standard Stations, supra note 15, at 296 (noting that the agreements under 
challenge were for specified terms or terminable every 6 months on 30 days' 
notice); id. at 319-20 (Douglas, J. dissenting) (arguing that ban on exclusive 
dealing contracts would lead to less desirable complete integration). 
133 See Marvel, supra note 99, at 7 ("Competing manufacturers can be 
expected to offer to the dealer a similar, but unadvertised or copied, product 
at a price reflecting only the opportunity cost of producing the good. The 
dealers, given the opportunity to sell an essentially identical product to a 
customer generated by the manufacturer's efforts, will certainly choose to 
substitute the rival product. To do so harms neither the dealer's reputation 
nor his sales. If the customer decision is based entirely on dealer 
recommendation (once the customer has been attracted to the dealer's store), 
the dealer's margin will increase, as he will obtain the same price at retail for 
the substitute good while avoiding the information charge at wholesale."). 
134 See nn.223-24, infra and accompanying text (explaining in greater 
detail why less restrictive alternatives are poor substitutes for exclusive 
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The recognition that exclusive dealing-whether "within" a firm 
or beyond it-can produce benefits that firms cannot otherwise attain 
demolished the inference that such contracts must necessarily be 
efforts to acquire or protect market power.135 Moreover, this recogni-
tion also undermined the assertion that parties employ market power 
to impose such contracts on their trading partners.136 For, when such 
agreements do, in fact, produce benefits of the sort just described, 
then parties will enter them voluntarily, without regard to any exer-
cise of market power.137 The application of TCE, then, required rejec-
tion of any claim that such agreements necessarily reflected "coercive 
leverage" or were a "clog on competition." 13S Instead, such agree-
dealing contracts). Some have argued that manufacturers can obtain some of 
the benefits of exclusive dealing by appointing only those dealers who agree to 
use their "best efforts" to distribute a manufacturer's product. See n.223, infra 
and accompanying text. However, such clauses would be more expensive to 
monitor and enforce than an exclusivity requirement. Moreover, even if such 
restrictions were costless to enforce, they could not prevent consumers drawn 
to a dealership from choosing knock-off brands despite the dealer's best efforts. 
135 See nn.65-80, supra and accompanying text (explaining how hostility 
toward such agreements rested upon negative inference drawn from 
supposed absence of beneficial effects). 
136 See nn.68-72, supra and accompanying text (explaining how price-
theoretic account of exclusive dealing agreements depended on assertion that 
firms employed market power to impose such agreements). It should be 
noted that Chicagoans did not really take issue with the assertion that parties 
employed market power to "impose" nonstandard contracts. See Meese, supra 
note 101, at 186 (explaining that Chicagoans assumed that manufacturers 
"imposed" minimum RPM against dealer wishes). 
137 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 9, at 24, 26-29 (explaining how 
proponents of nonstandard agreements can obtain assent to such contracts 
voluntarily, by offering nonstandard term at a price that reflects the benefits 
of the term to the seller). See also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New 
Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PENN L. REv. 1, 
68-70 (1997) (explaining how seller can obtain voluntary agreement to a tying 
contract that produces benefits internalized by the seller). 
138 Nonetheless, some scholars still maintain that exclusive dealing 
contracts obtained by firms with market power are necessarily "forced" on 
dealers by means of an "abusive exercise of market power." See LAWRENCE A. 
SULLIVAN & WARRENS. GRIMEs, THE LAw ANrrrRusr: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 
439 (2000). 
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ments were often voluntary methods of overcoming market failures 
and thus could enhance real world competition.139 Finally, TCE's 
claim that such agreements produced benefits did not rest simply 
upon an inference drawn from the absence of any possible harrn.14o 
Instead, TCE offered a prediction and specification of the benefits that 
such agreements will produce in particular circumstances.141 By con-
trast, one can read the works of Robert Bork and Richard Posner in 
vain for a description of such benefits.142 
At the same time, and unlike the Chicago critique, TCE did not 
purport to exclude the possibility that some such exclusive dealing-
whether unilateral or concerted-could harm consumers.143 Instead, 
proponents of TCE conceded that such restraints could produce 
harm, albeit not nearly as often as price theorists had supposed.144 
Thus, TCE raised the prospect, at least hypothetical, that a particular 
exclusive dealing arrangement could produce both harms and bene-
fits at the same time.I45 
139 See Meese, supra note 21, at 134--41 (explaining how TCE implied new 
conception of "contractual competition"). 
140 Cf. nn.95-100, supra and accompanying text (detailing Chicago 
school's reliance on such logic). 
141 See generally Cheung, supra note 28, at 4 (explaining how TCE offered 
a theory of vertical integration subject to empirical testing and refutation). 
142 See nn.95-100, supra and accompanying text (explaining how Chicago 
school account of exclusive dealing contracts rested almost entirely on mere 
inference that such restraints produced benefits). See also n.99, supra (citing 
authority explaining that exclusive dealing cannot in fact produce the one 
benefit invoked by Robert Bork). 
143 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEo. L.J. 271, 
289-93 (1988) (describing various forms of plausible strategic behavior, 
including "strategic (contractual) preemption of a critical resource (a concern 
of the USFL regarding access to TV networks vis a vis the NFL"). 
144 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 9, at 25 (reporting that "leverage 
theory" of exclusive dealing and other nonstandard agreements was 
discredited). 
145 See nn.263-83, infra and accompanying text (explaining how courts 
might analyze such restraints when they apparently produce both harms and 
benefits). 
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Taken together, the Chicago and TCE accounts of exclusive deal-
ing suggest that the "workable competition" account of such agree-
ments and antitrust's resulting hostility toward them is not justified. 
One can reject the strong critique offered by Bork and other members 
of the Chicago school without contradicting their observation that 
many restraints once deemed unlawful by the courts arose in circum-
stance in which anticompetitive harm seemed quite unlikely.146 Of 
course, this observation still begs the question of what purposes these 
restraints did serve.147 TCE, in tum, fills this gap, providing possible 
explanations for agreements that seem ill-suited for causing anticom-
petitive harm. 
Indeed, at a more basic level, TCE's recognition that exclusive 
dealing between separate firms is simply a particular form of nonstan-
dard contracting, analogous to the nonstandard contract known as 
the firm, should immediately give pause to those who would pursue 
aggressive policies toward exclusive dealing agreements. After all, 
TCE teaches that such agreements can produce the very same benefits 
as complete integration and concomitant exclusive dealing, conduct 
almost entirely beyond the scope of the antitrust laws, even during 
the inhospitality era.14s Absent some empirical or even theoretical 
showing, and I know of none, that "concerted" exclusive dealing pro-
duces more net harm than exclusivity that takes place "within the 
firm," pursuant to agreements between various actors, there seems to 
be no apparent rationale for the inhospitality era's relative hostility 
toward such agreements. Any policy toward exclusive dealing, then, 
must rest upon a theoretical apparatus divorced from the workable 
competition model and its outmoded theory of the firm. 
146 See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,320-21 (1966) (banning 
exclusive dealing contract that locked up one percent of a market's retail 
outlets). See also RICHARD A. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw 251-54 (2d ed. 2001) 
(conceding that exclusive dealing can in some circumstances protect a 
monopoly). 
147 See nn.95-100, supra and accompanying text (explaining how Chicago 
school offered no affirmative explanation for such agreements). 
148 See nn.81-82, supra and accompanying text (explaining how exclusive 
dealing within firms can only be unlawful if the firm has a monopoly and 
even then only in rare circumstances). 
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IV. RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 
The twin Chicago and TCE critiques created a demand for a 
new theory that could explain how and when exclusive dealing 
contracts might be anticompetitive. The theory of raising rivals' 
costs (RRC) filled that void.149 That is to say, RRC offered a theoreti-
cally coherent account of how certain interbrand restraints could 
raise the costs of a firm's rivals and therefore confer market power 
on the proponent of the agreement,tso So, for instance, a manufac-
turer could employ such agreements to "lock up" a market's most 
efficient distribution channels, thereby raising its rivals' costs of 
distribution. 151 Collective action problems may prevent dealers 
from resisting such strategies and prevent rival firms from protect-
ing themselves by bidding for the same outlets.152 Barriers to entry 
might prevent other dealers from replacing those who are "locked 
up," and forward integration by rivals may be an imperfect and 
costly alternative.153 While the various conditions necessary to sup-
149 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209, 
219-25 (1986) (explaining how academic attacks on various doctrines created 
need for new theory to explain existing practices). 
150 See id. at 224-30 (articulating this objective of raising rivals' costs theory). 
151 See id. at 223-27; id. at 226 (explaining how retail services can best be 
interpreted as inputs in the overall process of manufacture and distribution). 
Cf. Bork & Bowman, supra note 83, at 367 (suggesting that it was "perhaps 
conceivable" that in some cases a firm might succeed in using exclusive 
agreements to impose higher costs on its rivals than on itselO. 
152 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 269-72 (explaining why 
such strategies may not always be successful). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Predatory Strategies and Counter Strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1981) 
(explaining how victims of predatory strategies can sometimes fight back); 
POSNER, supra note 83, at 203-04 (contending that dealers may attempt to resist 
imposition of predatory exclusive dealing contracts). 
153 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 225 (explaining that 
presence of barriers to entry is a necessary condition to a successful RRC 
strategy). Cf. Meese, supra note 12, at 56, nn. 24&-49 (collecting sources for the 
proposition that complete vertical integration can be a costly alternative to 
partial integration); Klein, supra note 120, at 359 n.2 (explaining why franchisors 
may prefer reliance on independent franchisees to complete integration). 
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port such a strategy are comparatively rare, RRC theorists have 
convincingly shown that such strategies are at least theoretically 
possible, if not very likely.IS4 
The RRC account essentially sidesteps the most prominent 
Chicago critique of price theory's hostility toward such agreements. 
Recall here that price theory argued that proponents of such agree-
ments could employ preexisting market power or "leverage" to 
"impose" these contracts on dealers and suppliers. 1ss Chicago 
responded by claiming that a firm could not profitably use preexist-
ing power to gain even more. 1S6 Unlike price theory's "leverage" 
account, which entailed the possession or exercise of preexisting mar-
ket power, RRC explained how a firm with no market power in the 
first place could acquire such power by entering exclusionary rights 
agreements.157 In so doing, RRC answered Robert Bork's challenge to 
identify a situation in which a firm with no market power could use 
exclusionary agreements to impose higher costs on its rivals and thus 
154 See Krattenrnaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 267 ("Certainly, in most 
industries exclusionary rights contracts cannot be profitably employed for 
anticompetitive ends."). 
155 See nn.60-80, supra and accompanying text. 
156 See, e.g., BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 306--07 (contending 
that claims that exclusive dealing contracts lead to monopoly rest upon "the 
error of double-counting" and that "a supplier cannot purchase its way to 
monopoly through exclusive dealing contracts"). See also nn.85-100, supra and 
accompanying text (outlining Chicago position on vertical restraints). It 
should be noted that Bork also addressed the argument that a firm with, say, 
10% of the market could take over the market by signing up a larger 
percentage of the dealerships in it. See nn.91-94, supra and accompanying text. 
157 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert Lande & Steven C. Salop, 
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 241, 254-55 
(1987) (explaining that, under a successful RRC strategy, "[i]t is the 
exclusionary conduct that creates the market power being evaluated, not the 
other way around."); Krattenrnaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 251 ("A firm 
need not enjoy or acquire traditional market power to gain the ability to price 
above pre-exclusionary rights levels."). See also Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a 
(Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. 
111, 145-46 (explaining how franchisor can pursue raising rivals' cost strategy 
without preexisting market power). 
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acquire market power.158 Indeed, instead of coercing dealers to accept 
such contracts involuntarily, proponents of RRC showed that firms 
who possess no market power can convince input suppliers to enter 
such agreements voluntarily, by promising to share with them a por-
tion of any monopoly profits that the agreements produce.159 Far from 
"coercive leverage," then, RRC agreements simply rearrange property 
rights in a way that confers market power and the fruits thereof on 
the parties to them.16o 
V. ANTITRUST DOCTRINE RESPONDS 
The various developments in economic theory recounted above 
have apparently influenced law and enforcement policy.161 Lower 
courts, at least, have rejected Standard Oil's hostility toward exclu-
sive dealing agreements entered by nonmonopolists in favor of a 
more open-ended rule of reason test.162 Under this approach, plain-
158 See Bork & Bowman, supra note 83, at 367. It should be noted that the 
RRC paradigm in no way answered Chicago's account of intrabrand 
restraints. See nn.83-84, supra and accompanying text (noting Chicago's 
critique of the inhospitality approach to intrabrand restraints). 
159 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1369, 
1376-77 (1991) (explaining how vertically-related firms can cooperate to 
create and share supracompetitive profits). See also Meese, supra note 157, at 
146 (explaining how franchisors could induce franchisees to enter contracts 
that raise rivals' costs by sharing monopoly profits with them). 
160 Cf. Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AMER. EcoN. REv. 47 (1984) 
(explaining how property is simply a method of creating barriers to entry). 
161 See Jacobson, supra note 15, at 324 (asserting that "the Chicago School 
laissez-faire approach to vertical restraints ... contributed to a trend towards 
upholding exclusive dealing arrangements even at increasingly higher levels 
of foreclosure''). 
162 See Paddock Publications, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune, 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 
1996) (sustaining contracts that provided incumbent newspapers with exclusive 
rights to publish news content from largest suppliers in the marketplace). 
Some courts have concluded that the Supreme Court relaxed the 
standards governing exclusive dealing contracts in Tampa Electric Co. v. 
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). See Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser 
Industries, 749 F.2d 380, 393 (7th Cir. 1984) (opining that Tampa Electric held 
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tiffs must at least show that such agreements foreclose rivals from a 
very substantial share of the market for inputs necessary to the man-
ufacture or distribution of rivals' products.163 Moreover, even if the 
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, it will not necessarily pre-
vail. Instead, proponents of such agreements can still abduce evi-
dence that, despite their exclusionary impact, such agreements will 
produce significant benefits that counteract any anticompetitive 
that exclusive dealing contracts are analyzed under a full-blown rule of 
reason). If so, then one could argue that courts relaxed the Standard Stations 
test "on their own," before the advent of TCE. 
Closer analysis suggests that this interpretation of Tampa Electric is 
extremely creative. The decision in no way questioned the vitality of Standard 
Stations and instead reiterated that an exclusive dealing contract was 
unlawful if it was "probable that the performance of the contract will 
foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected." 
See Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 327; id. at 327-29 (discussing Standard Stations 
with approval). Moreover, the Court's articulation of its foreclosure test 
omitted any mention of efficiencies or possible justifications for such 
agreements, focusing instead on the requirement that an agreement preempt 
a significant share of a properly defined line of commerce. See Tampa Electric, 
365 U.S. at 327-28. Finally, the court rejected the challenge to the agreement 
before it after finding that it only implicated 0.77% of the line of commerce in 
question. See id. at 333. In short, Tampa Electric does not seem to authorize a 
full-blown rule of reason analysis for exclusive dealing contracts. See also 
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 322 ("[D]id the Tampa Electric Court authorize full-
scale rule of reason analysis? Although later cases have suggested that it did, 
the Court's own words continued to emphasize percentage foreclosure as the 
key determinant."). 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50-53 (D.D.C. 
1999) (summarizing law on exclusive dealing under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act); id. at 52 (concluding that modern case law requires finding that 
exclusive dealing contracts foreclose rivals from 40% of the marketplace); 
Omega Envtl, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(finding 38% foreclosure insufficient to make out prima facie case that 
exclusive dealing agreement violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts, at least 
where there appeared to be alternate channels of distribution); Paddock 
Publications, 103 F.3d at 46-47 (availability of alternate suppliers and short 
duration of contracts doomed claim that exclusive dealing contract offended 
section 1). But compare Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 
Inc., 676 F.2d 1291, 1301-{)7 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that foreclosure of 24% of 
the market sufficed to establish a prima facie case). 
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harm.164 At the same time, even if a defendant proves that such ben-
efits "outweigh" any harms, the plaintiff will still prevail if it can 
show that the defendant can achieve the same benefits through a 
means less restrictive than the agreement in question. 165 Thus, while 
courts are much less hostile to such agreements than they once 
were, they nonetheless subject some such contracts to meaningful 
scrutiny, rejecting Chicago's call to place all such agreements 
beyond antitrust scrutiny altogether.166 The enforcement agencies 
have also taken a less aggressive approach to such agreements, 
albeit again without embracing Chicago's call for per se legality.167 
In the same way, exclusive dealing contracts obtained by monopo-
lists are no longer unlawful per se.16s Instead, such agreements are 
prima facie unlawful if they foreclose rivals from a significant fraction 
of a relevant input market.169 At the same time, defendants can rebut 
this showing by proving that the restriction is no broader than neces-
164 See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (summarizing law on this point). See 
also United States v. VISA, 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (articulating this 
test to govern rules by VISA and MasterCard Networks preventing banks 
who distributed one or the other cards from also distributing rivals' cards). 
This approach is simply an application of the rule of reason to these types of 
agreements. See Meese, supra note 21, at 99-113 (detailing general rule of 
reason test whereby plaintiff first makes out a prima facie case, defendant 
then adduces evidence that restraint produces benefits, after which the 
plaintiff may respond by showing that the defendant can achieve the benefits 
in question through a means less restrictive of competition). 
165 See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. at 52 (summarizing law on this issue). 
166 See nn.85-100, supra and accompanying text (describing Chicago's 
position, particularly that of Judge Bork). 
167 See In re Beltone, 100 F.T.C. 68, 197-204, 209-10 (1982) (finding that 
foreclosure of eight percent of the market did not suffice to make out a prima 
facie case). 
168 See nn.15-16, supra and accompanying text (explaining how courts once 
treated exclusive dealing contracts obtained by monopolists as unlawful per se). 
169 See LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 157-59 (3d Cir. 2003) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (finding exclusive dealing arrangements 
presumptively unlawful even though "victim" of such contracts remained a 
significant force in the marketplace); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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sary to produce significant benefits, benefits that some courts will 
weigh against any anticompetitive harm.170 Thus, if a plaintiff can show 
that the defendant can achieve the very same benefits through means 
less restrictive than the agreements in question, the agreements will 
offend section 2, even if they produce more wealth than they destroy.171 
At the same time, exclusive dealing that takes place pursuant to the 
nonstandard contract known as the firm is lawful per se so long as the 
firm in question is not a monopolist.172 So, for instance, a firm with 50% 
of the market may decline to deal with its rivals even if that refusal 
places the rivals at a significant competitive disadvantage.m Moreover, 
even if a firm is a monopolist, it may decline to deal with rivals in a wide 
variety of circumstances, even if that refusal places rivals at a significant 
disadvantage.174 Indeed, some courts hold that a refusal to deal can only 
170 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70-71. Other courts, however, have 
articulated the test without suggesting that any balancing is required. See 
Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 4_84-88 (1992) (proof that 
restriction is necessary to serve a legitimate business purpose would establish 
restraint's legality). 
171 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (stating that proof that a restraint 
produces benefits shifts burden to plaintiff to rebut that claim) (citing Capital 
Imaging Assoc., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., et al., 996 F.2d 
537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (detailing rule of reason analysis)). Capital Imaging, it 
should be noted, endorsed the less restrictive alternative test as a component 
of rule of reason analysis. See Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543 ("Assuming 
defendant comes forward with such proof [i.e., that a restraint produces 
significant benefits], the burden shifts back to plaintiff for it to demonstrate 
that any legitimate collaborative objectives could have been achieved by less 
restrictive alternatives."). See also Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484-86 (rejecting 
proffered justification for tying contract where monopolist defendant could 
purportedly achieve legitimate objectives via less restrictive means). 
172 See Copperweld Corp. et al. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984) ("agreements" governing conduct that takes place within a particular 
firm fall outside scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
173 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 758-67 (holding that coordinated effort by 
parent and wholly owned subsidiary to organize boycott of the plaintiff were 
not "concerted action" and thus not subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
174 See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinka, 124 S. 
Ct. 872, 87~79 (2004) (without more, monopolist's refusal to deal could not give 
rise to liability under section 2); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, 
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violate section 2 if it excludes rivals from the market altogether.175 In 
short, modem law still distinguishes between exclusive dealing that is 
unilateral, on the one hand, and that which constitutes concerted action, 
on the other. 
In light of recent developments in economic theory, it seems safe to 
say that modem law constitutes an improvement over the doctrine that 
courts generated during the inhospitality era. Most fundamentally, by 
requiring proof that a restraint at least forecloses rivals from a more sub-
stantial share of the market, the law now leaves unscathed a large number 
of exclusive dealing contracts that courts and agencies once banned.176 
Moreover, by allowing defendants to adduce evidence that a restraint 
produces benefits, courts and the enforcement agencies ensure that some 
such agreements that do result in significant foreclosure will survive con-
dernnation.177 At the same time, a priori, there is no reason to surmise that 
modem law is a perfect reflection of economic theory. Indeed, one would 
almost be surprised if it were: antitrust law still bans various agreements 
that modem economic theory treats as harmless or beneficial.178 
Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 54~6 (9th Cir. 1991) (a monopolist's refusal to deal only 
offends section 2 if it eliminates competition all together). 
175 See Alaska Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d at 54~6; Twin Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1990). 
176 See nn.15-25, supra and accompanying text (explaining how courts 
voided most such agreements during the inhospitality era). 
177 See nn.15-16, supra and accompanying text (explaining how exclusive 
dealing agreements by monopolists were once unlawful per se). 
178 For instance, courts still declare minimum resale price maintenance 
unlawful per se, even though scholars generally agree that such restraints are 
almost always beneficial. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717 (1988). Moreover, courts cling to the ban on maximum horizontal price 
fixing, despite persuasive arguments that such agreements are often beneficial. 
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1982). See 
also, e.g., Meese, supra note 56 (arguing that courts are unduly hostile to 
"exclusionary" agreements obtained by monopolists); Meese, supra note 12 
(arguing that courts are unduly hostile to concerted intrabrand restraints); 
Meese, supra note 21 (arguing that courts are unduly hostile to restraints that 
avoid per se treatment because they may overcome market failures); Meese, 
supra note 137 (arguing that per se rule against ties obtained by firms with 
market power makes no sense in light of TCE). 
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VI. A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Any effort to conform existing exclusive dealing doctrine to the 
lessons of economic theory would entail consideration of the follow-
ing questions. First, what should a plaintiff have to show to establish 
a prima facie case? Second, if a plaintiff does establish such a case, 
what sort of evidence must a defendant adduce to rebut it? Finally, if 
a defendant does adduce sufficient evidence to rebut a prima facie 
case, how does the finder of fact go about evaluating or "weighing" 
the evidence that is before it? For instance, should courts and agencies 
"balance" a restraint's harmful impact against its beneficial effects?179 
Moreover, if courts do engage in such balancing, what relevance, if 
any, should courts attribute to the presence of a "less restrictive 
means" of achieving the benefits produced by the restraint?180 
The most obvious means of establishing a prima facie case is 
proof that a restraint results in a particular degree of foreclosure. 
Courts take such an approach in the monopolization context, where 
proof that a restraint results in a "significant" degree of foreclosure 
will suffice to establish a prima facie case.1s1 The bar is a bit higher 
179 See United States v. VISA, 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that 
rule of reason analysis entails a determination of whether "the 
anticompetitive effects of a restraint are outweighed by some procompetitive 
justification"); In re Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 217 (opining that benefits of 
exclusive dealing arrangements involve "welfare trade-offs," and 
"simultaneously may produce conflicting effects on consumer welfare"). See 
also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (lOth Cir. 1998) (under the rule of 
reason, "the harms and benefits [of a restraint] must be weighted against each 
other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, 
reasonable."). Some scholars have also portrayed rule of reason analysis as 
involving such balancing. 7 AREEDA, supra note 8, 'li 1507c, at 380-90. 
180 See VISA, 344 F.3d at 238 (after the defendants show that a restraint 
produces benefits, a plaintiff may prevail by showing that "those objectives 
may be achieved in a manner less restrictive of competition"); l.Jlw, 134 F.3d 
at 1019 (plaintiffs can prevail in a rule of reason case by showing that the 
"defendants' objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive 
manner''). 
181 See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 70-71. (D.C. Cir. 2001) In a 
recent appellate brief, the Department of Justice argued that a monopolist 
must justify any conduct that "tends to impair the monopolists' rivals." See 
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where the defendant is not a monopolist: there some courts have said 
that a plaintiff may establish such a case by showing that the restraint 
forecloses rivals from reaching 40% or more of the market.1B2 Indeed, 
in the recent VISA decision, the Second Circuit held that VISA's 
exclusivity regulations forbidding member banks from issuing and 
distributing American Express cards completely excluded American 
Express from a particular "segment of the market," even though the 
restraints left Amex perfectly free to reach consumers in other 
ways.183 This exclusion, the court said, was "the most persuasive evi-
dence of harm to competition" and was thus central to the govern-
ment's prima facie case. 1s4 Moreover, the district court in the 
Brief for the United States at 26, U.S. v. Dentsply Int'l, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 
2005) (No. 03-4097). See also id. at 25 ("[e]xclusionary'' conduct "comprehends" 
behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals but also 
does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way), quoting Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985) (quoting 3 DoNALD F. TURNER & PHILLIP AREEDA, 
ANTITRUST LAW 'II 626b, at 78 (1978)). As the Department's brief noted, this 
formulation of "exclusionary conduct" reappears unchanged in the latest 
version of Professor Areeda's treatise. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HoVENKAMP, ANTITRusT LAw 'II 651f, at 83-84 (2d ed. 2002). See also Meese, supra 
note 56, at 809-11 (showing that monopolization standards advocated by 
current version of Areeda treatise are unchanged from 1978 version). 
182 See United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 52 (D.D.C. 1999); 
Omega Envtl v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-63. (9th Cir. 1997). See also 
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. v. Appleton Papers, 35 F. Supp.2d 1138, 1143-45 
(D. Minn. 1999) (finding sufficient foreclosure to support finding of section 1 
violation based upon foreclosure of two-thirds of the market). 
183 VISA, 344 F.3d at 240; id. at 242 (noting that American Express and 
Discover were the largest and fifth largest issuers of credit cards in the nation). 
184 Id. at 240 (''The most persuasive evidence of harm to competition is the 
total exclusion of American Express and Discover from a segment of the market 
for network services."); id. ('1t is largely undisputed that the exclusionary rules 
have resulted in the failure of VISA and MasterCard member banks to become 
issuers of American Express and Discover-branded cards."). 
The VISA court attempted to justify its heavy reliance upon 
foreclosure evidence by characterizing the exclusive agreements there as 
involving horizontal cooperation by the various member banks bound by the 
restraints, who collectively owned VISA and MasterCard. See id. at 242. By 
the same logic, however, a franchise system that imposed exclusivity on its 
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Microsoft decision opined that proof that a restraint "foreclosed" 
rivals from 40% of the market would suffice to establish a prima facie 
case under section J.18S On the other hand, a unilateral refusal to deal 
member franchisees would suffer more searching scrutiny under the antitrust 
laws because franchisees are actual or potential rivals who effectively appoint 
the franchisor as a monitor of their activities. See Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the 
Quick Look: Reconstructing the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANrrrRuST 
L. J. 461, 491-92 (2000); WILLIAMSON, supra note 9, at 181-82 (characterizing 
franchise contract in this manner); HERBERT HovENI<AMP, ANTITRUST PoLICY 205 
(1999) ("[R]estaurateurs scattered across a wide area might develop joint menus, 
building plans, and methods of doing business, and then promote their 'chain' 
nationally. This national name recognition will enable them to reach traveling 
customers that might otherwise avoid a local restaurant about which they know 
nothing."). See also Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the 
Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223 (1978) (articulating this economic rationale 
of franchising). Of course, this "logic" makes little sense. A restraint is not 
particularly suspect simply because it is "horizontal." See Chicago Profl Sports, 
Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593,598 (7th Cir. 1996) (separate ownership of McDonald's 
franchisees does not suggest that cooperation between franchisees is a cartel); id. 
at 600 (noting that McDonald's franchisees can coordinate "the release of a new 
hamburger"); Glenn Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1177, 1187 (2002) ("Some commentators argue that collective activity 
should be scrutinized more closely than single-firm activity because it has a 
greater potential for harm. As a general proposition this is dubious. Power is 
power, whether exercised by one firm acting alone or four firms acting in 
collusion. In the face of certain alleged offenses, such as horizontal price fixing, 
singling out the element of concerted activity is appropriate. However, refusals 
to deal bear little resemblance to price fixing. If refusing to deal harms a 
competitor, then that harm is not greater at the hands of a four-firm cartel with 
substantial market power than from a single firm with equal market power."); 
United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) 
(characterizing various horizontal agreements as "ancillary" restraints, subject 
to forgiving rule of reason analysis). Thus, so long as defendants can articulate 
plausible potential benefits of such horizontal agreements and thus avoid per se 
treatment, courts should accord them the same rule of reason treatment 
accorded vertical restraints or, for that matter, horizontal mergers. See generally, 
Meese, Quick Look, supra, at 478-89. 
It remains to be seen whether lower courts will extend VISA's 
suspicion of foreclosure to purely vertical exclusive dealing arrangements, or, 
instead, reject VISA altogether and deemphasize the importance of 
foreclosure evidence in all contexts. 
185 See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
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by a monopolist does not, by itself, give raise to a prima facie case for 
liability, even if that refusal severely hinders rivals.186 
Reliance on exclusion, no matter how complete, as a basis for 
establishing a prima facie case does not make economic sense in light 
of recent advances in economic theory, particularly transaction cost 
economics. The potential benefits of exclusive dealing depend upon 
exclusion of rivals from at least part of the marketplace at a particular 
moment in time. For instance, such agreements can prevent interbrand 
free riding by excluding rivals from certain dealers.JB7 In this way, 
these restraints rely upon the force of contract to create the equivalent 
of property rights.188 The benefits of property, of course, depend upon 
exclusion and the resulting ability to consume or exchange the 
resource that is subject to the property right; that, indeed, is the eco-
nomic definition of property.189 Firms that engage in (unilateral) "com-
petition on the merits" exercise these rights by "refusing to deal" with 
rivals, and such refusals are presumptively efficient means of ensuring 
that a firm recoups its investment in creation and innovation,190 More-
over, courts routinely sustain as "reasonable" restraints that create the 
contractual equivalent of property rights by entirely excluding firms 
or individuals from particular portions of the marketplace.191 At the 
186 See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 878--80 
(2004); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 948 F.2d 536,543-45 (9th Cir. 1991). 
187 See Marvel, supra note 99, at 7-8. 
188 See id. 
169 See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RiGHTS 3 (1997); 
Demsetz, supra note 160 (1984) (property is a state-created barrier to entry). 
190 See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. 
REv. 253, 294-305 (2003). 
191 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-82 (6th 
Cir. 1898) (courts should analyze covenants ancillary to the sale of a business 
under a forgiving rule of reason); Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 116 
F. 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1902) (sustaining as reasonable covenant that prohibited 
postemployment competition within 1500 miles of the employee's place of 
business); see also MICHAEL C. TREBILCOCK, RESTRAINT OF TRADE 252-53 (1986) 
(explaining how covenants ancillary to the sale of a business facilitate the 
seller's initial investment in the business by creating "limited property rights 
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same time, the realization of such benefits in no way depends upon 
the possession or exercise of market power.l92 Ownership and exercise 
of property rights does not itself entail market power or its exercise. 
Because exclusive dealing contracts may produce benefits, and 
because those benefits depend upon exclusion and are unrelated to 
market power, settled principles of antitrust procedure preclude 
reliance upon mere exclusion as the basis for a prima facie case. 
According to the Supreme Court, legal presumptions in the antitrust 
context cannot rest upon "formalistic line drawing," but must instead 
depend upon "actual market realities."193 As a matter of "market real-
ity," TCE suggests that, by itself, contractual exclusion is at least 
equally consistent with a beneficial interpretation of such restraints as 
it is with a harmful one. Given that plaintiffs bear the burden of prov-
ing that a restraint produces net competitive harm, the mere existence 
of exclusion, without more, cannot support the entry of judgment 
against a defendant.I94 Instead, the plaintiff must provide something 
more-something that as a logical matter tends to exclude the possi-
bility that a restraint simply overcomes transaction costs by creating a 
in these assets in the purchaser that protect him from reappropriation of 
those assets by the vendor."). 
192 See nn.135-39, supra and accompanying text. 
193 Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 467-68 (1992) 
("[L]egal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual 
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). See also 
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 47-58 (1978) (rejecting legal 
distinction between consignment agreements and those in which title had 
passed as formalistic and inconsistent with market realities). 
194 See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999) (mere 
reduction in rivalry does not give rise to prima facie case where restraint 
could create plausible benefits). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95 (1986) (noting that evidence that is as 
consistent with procompetitive as with anticompetitive objectives cannot, 
without more, support an inference of anticompetitive conduct); Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite, 465 U.S. 752, 761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities 
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1968) (same). See also Meese, supra note 21, at 
145--61 (arguing that proof that a restraint results in higher prices cannot itself 
establish prima facie case, since such evidence is equally consistent with the 
defendant's assertion that such restraints overcome a market failure). 
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contractual property right, for instance.195 It should not matter that 
the defendant possesses a monopoly: even monopolists face and seek 
to minimize transaction costs.196 
Let us assume, however, that courts do--as some do now under 
section 1 and section 2-allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case 
simply by showing that a restraint excludes rivals from a given por-
tion of the marketplace.197 How, then, should courts go about evaluat-
ing defendants' claims that such restraints in fact produce benefits by 
overcoming a market failure? Under current law, defendants must 
adduce evidence that such restrictions produce significant benefits.198 
Moreover, such proof, even if completely persuasive to the court, 
does not itself entitle the defendant to judgment. Instead, such proof 
simply entitles the defendant to a jury determination of whether the 
harms of such restraints nonetheless "outweigh" their benefits.199 
Indeed, juries are entitled to find restraints unreasonable even in 
some cases where benefits outweigh harms. To be precise, if a defen-
dant shows that a restraint's benefits outweigh its harms, the plaintiff 
195 See California Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 775 n.12. See also Business Elecs. v. 
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) (courts should not allow juries to 
second-guess termination decisions that are plausibly directed at combatting free 
riding); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587-95 (evidence that is equally 
consistent with procompetitive or benign conduct cannot itself support an 
inference that defendants are engaged in an unlawful conspiracy); id. at 588 ( "[I)n 
Monsanto we held that conduct as consistent with permissible competition as 
with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust 
conspiracy."), citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Services, 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
196 Cf. Cargill v. Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) ("[i]t is in the interest of 
competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition") 
(quoting ArthurS. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 
(6th Cir. 1983)). 
197 See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d: 34, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See 
also United States v. VISA, 344 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2003) (relying upon this 
sort of evidence as most persuasive evidence of anticompetitive effects 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case); Eastman Kodak, 504 at 484--88 (proof 
that restriction is necessary to serve a legitimate business purpose would 
establish restraint's legality under section 2). 
198 See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. 
199 See VISA, 344 F.3d at 238; Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. 
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may prevail nonetheless if it shows to the jury's satisfaction that the 
defendant could achieve the very same or perhaps nearly the same 
benefits by means of a less restrictive altemative.2oo If such a less restric-
tive alternative is present, juries must condemn the restraint, even 
though its benefits outweigh its costs. In these circumstances, courts 
penalize defendants for not increasing society's welfare enough.201 
This modern approach to incorporating the benefits of such 
restraints into rule of reason analysis is seriously flawed in light of 
TCE and RRC theory. For one thing, the whole notion of balancing or 
weighing a restraint's harms against its benefits depends upon an 
assumption that the benefits that a defendant has proved coexist with 
tangible harms.202 As I have shown elsewhere, however, the plausibil-
ity of this "coexistence assumption" depends critically upon the 
requirements for establishing the prima facie case. For, it is such a 
case that gives rise to the requirement that the defendant produce evi-
dence of benefits in the first place.203 Where the plaintiff has adduced 
evidence establishing a strong probability of harm, then it may make 
sense to assume that the benefits of such a restraint coexist with 
harms. The classic and paradigmatic example is in the merger context, 
where a plaintiff shows that the transaction results in a very concen-
trated market into which entry is extremely difficult and tacit collu-
sion is otherwise quite feasible.zo4 In these circumstances, it makes 
sense to assume that the merger either has led or will lead to the exer-
2oo See VISA, 344 F.3d at 238. See also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 
(10th Cir. 1998). 
201 See Meese, supra note 21, at 110-13 (detailing operation of less 
restrictive alternative test). 
202 See id. at 161-67 (showing that rule of reason balancing depends upon 
assumption that a restraint's benefits coexist with harms). Cf. In re Beltone, 
100 F.T.C. 68, 217 (1982) (explaining that benefits of exclusive dealing 
arrangements can coexist with anticompetitive effects). 
203 See Meese, supra note 21, at 145-67. 
204 See generally Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
Joint Merger Guidelines 1992 (as amended in 1997) (detailing standards that 
agencies apply when evaluating horizontal mergers). See also, e.g., FTC v. 
Cardinal Health, Inc. 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that the FTC 
had made out a prima facie case under these standards). 
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cise of market power and resulting harm due to coordinated interac-
tion.zos Moreover, proof that a transaction produces technological effi-
ciencies does not really cast doubt upon the initial presumption that 
the transaction will facilitate the exercise of market power; both 
harms and benefits can logically coexist.206 Thus, if the proponent of 
the merger can show that the transaction will produce significant effi-
ciencies, then it makes sense to weigh or balance those efficiencies 
against the predicted anticompetitive harm to determine which 
effects predominate.207 This, of course, is the approach taken by Pro-
fessor Williamson in his famous article contending that relatively 
modest efficiencies likely outweigh the harms produced by a merger 
to monopoly.208 
Such an approach makes far less sense-if any sense at all-
where courts allow plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case against 
exclusive dealing contracts simply by proving the existence of a par-
ticular amount of foreclosure. To be sure, proof of significant or even 
complete exclusion is generally a necessary condition for a conclu-
sion that an exclusive dealing arrangement produces anticompetitive 
harm.209 However, such exclusion is by no means a sufficient condi-
tion. Even if a restraint does exclude rivals from a large share of the 
marketplace at a particular moment in time, rivals may be able to 
2os See PosNER, supra note 146, at 69-93 (detailing various sorts of 
evidence bearing upon prospect of coordinated interaction by horizontal 
rivals). 
206 See Williamson, supra note 50. 
2rr7 Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 62--63; FfC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. 
Supp. 1066, 1088-90 (D.D.C. 1997). But compare Timothy J. Muris, The 
Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years, 7 GEo. 
MAS. L. REv. 729, 734-40 (1999) (arguing that evidence that establishes a prima 
facie case under the Merger Guidelines only gives rise to a "weak 
presumption" that such transactions are in fact anticompetitive, with the 
result that proof of efficiencies should rebut the presumption). 
208 See Williamson, supra note 50. 
209 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 258--60. The qualification 
("generally") is meant to refer to those instances in which agreements 
producing relatively small foreclosure may still facilitate the coordinated or 
interdependent exercise of market power by remaining input suppliers. See 
id. at 260--62. 
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adjust their behavior in a manner that easily overcomes any apparent 
exclusionary impactz1o For instance, rivals may integrate forward or 
backward to create and obtain their own supply of the relevant 
inputs. Or, they may sponsor entry by new producers of inputs and 
thereby circumvent any exclusionary strategy.211 Finally, the product 
sold by the rivals in question may not even be part of a relevant 
antitrust product market.212 
Thus, even where the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case by 
establishing a particular degree of foreclosure, there is no reason to 
believe that such restraints probably create anticompetitive harm. 
Any presumption to the contrary is simply a throwback to price the-
ory's reflexive equation of exclusion with competitive harm, where 
"competition" is equated with atomistic rivalry.m Thus, given "actual 
market realities," current law can only be described as a process of 
burden-shifting, unrelated to any real presumption of harm. Once the 
defendant adduces unrebutted proof that a restraint produces bene-
fits, there seems to be even less reason to believe that a restraint 
meaningfully raises the costs of rivals and thus produces anticompeti-
210 Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 152, at 265-76. 
m See Krattenrnaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 235 (barriers to entry a 
necessary condition for any RRC strategy to succeed). Cf. Easterbrook, supra 
note 152, at 270-71 (contending that consumers would voluntarily encourage 
victim of predation to remain in the marketplace); PosNER, supra note 83, at 
203-04 (contending that customers of predator will shift business to 
predator's rivals to preserve competition). 
212 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 255-57 (contending that 
courts can rely upon the approach to market power taken by the Merger 
Guidelines to determine whether the agreement in question provides 
predator with power over the price of rivals' inputs). Cf. 1992 Deptartment of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines§ 1.1 (stating that, 
in defining a relevant product market, the agencies should consider "the 
influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output 
markets"). 
m See nn.l18-42, supra and accompanying text (explaining how TCE 
undermines atomistic model of competition as a useful guide to antitrust 
policy). See also nn.34-80, supra and accompanying text (explaining how 
hostility toward exclusive dealing during the inhospitality era rested upon 
atomistic vision of competition). 
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tive harm.214 Therefore, there is no basis for "balancing" these benefits 
against assumed, but unproven, harms. Instead, proof by a defendant 
that a restraint produces significant benefits should entitle the defen-
dant to judgment.215 
But what if, despite such evidence, a plaintiff can show that the 
defendant can achieve these very same benefits through some less 
restrictive means?216 If so, logic and wise antitrust policy would seem 
to compel a judgment in the plaintiff's favor. After all, if the defendant 
can achieve the very same benefits through means that do not exclude 
rivals, then it would seem that courts should condemn an exclusive 
dealing contract, and thereby enhance rivalry and consumer welfare 
without sacrificing any benefits produced by such agreements.217 
Still, two distinct shortcomings beset this argument. First, experi-
ence suggests that alternatives that are deemed "less restrictive" are 
also less effective at furthering the defendant's legitimate interests. 
Over the years, courts and scholars have proffered less restrictive 
alternatives for tying contracts, minimum resale price maintenance, 
and horizontal and vertical exclusive territories.21s Subsequent analy-
214 Cf Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 278 (suggesting that, under 
the rule of reason, proof that a restraint produces significant benefits in fact 
impels courts to reexamine the initial finding that the restraint produces harm). 
215 I have made a similar argument as it relates to horizontal and vertical 
restraints that avoid per se condemnation because they might overcome a 
market failure. See Meese, supra note 21, at 161-67. 
216 See nn.200--01, supra and accompanying text (explaining how presence 
of less restrictive alternative dooms a restraint under current law). 
217 Cf. In re Beltone, 100 F.T.C. 68, 217 (1982) (suggesting that exclusive 
dealing produces harm whenever it prevents a consumer from purchasing a 
product that it otherwise would have purchased). 
218 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 138, at 332 (identifying area of 
primary responsibility as less restrictive means of encouraging promotion by 
joint venture partners); Thomas Piraino, A New Antitrust Standard for Joint 
Ventures, 35 W&M L. REv. 871,930 (1991) (same); Lawrence Sullivan, The Viability 
of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints Doctrine, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 835, 886 
(1987) (arguing that area of primary responsibility was viable less restrictive 
alternative to restraints in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 
596 (1972)); Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint 
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sis, buttressed by advances in TCE, has shown that such less restric-
tive alternatives are rarely, if ever, as effective at furthering a legiti-
mate interest as the restraint that is under scrutiny. For one thing, 
such alternatives often involve a higher cost of monitoring, communi-
cation, and enforcement than outright tying or exclusive territories, 
for instance.219 Second, putting aside these costs, TCE suggests that 
various less restrictive alternatives simply do not serve the same 
objective as the restraints under challenge. For instance, many have 
argued that manufacturers need not adopt exclusive territories or 
minimum RPM to prevent free riding by their dealers, but may 
instead simply specify the sort of promotion in which they wish their 
dealers to engage, terminating those dealers that do not fulfill such 
obligations.22o While appealing on its face, this less restrictive alterna-
tive may simply further a different interest from that served by an 
exclusive territory or minimum RPM, for instance. In particular, the 
whole point of a more restrictive restraint may be to confer a sort of 
property right upon a dealer, so that it, and not the manufacturer, can 
decide upon the exact type and combination of promotional activities 
that will attract local consumers.221 By definition, manufacturer-gener-
ated and enforced promotional obligations cannot serve this interest 
in decentralization, an interest served by property rights in general.222 
Ventures, 74 GEo. L.J. 1605, 1621 (1986) (arguing that the defendants in Topco 
could have achieved the legitimate objective of furthering promotion by 
adopting areas of primary responsibility); LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 386 
(1977) (manufacturer can adequately further interest in promotion by stipulating 
desired service in distribution contract and monitoring dealer's compliance with 
it); Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Shennan Act, 75 HARv. L. 
REv. 655, 699 (1962) (area of primary responsibility will assure effective 
promotion by dealers thus obviating need for exclusive territories). 
219 
220 
See Meese, supra note 137, at 71--84; Meese, supra note 101, at 189-95. 
See Robert Pitofsky, Why Dr. Miles Was Right, 8 REGULATION 27,29 (1984). 
221 See Meese, supra note 131, at 595-607. 
222 See id. at 608-11 (explaining how intrabrand restraints create property 
rights that serve decentralization interest not served by less restrictive 
alternatives). See also Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division, supra note 83, at 
468 (contending that less restrictive alternative in the form of areas of primary 
responsibility cannot serve same decentralizing interest as exclusive 
territory). 
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Similar shortcomings likely plague purported less restrictive alter-
natives to exclusive dealing contracts. Consider again a requirement 
that dealers buy only from a particular manufacturer. While recognizing 
that such restraints can produce benefits, scholars at least at one time 
argued that manufacturers can realize such benefits by, for instance, 
supervising their dealers and terminating those who are insufficiently 
attentive to a manufacturer's interests.223 Obviously such an alternative 
will be more expensive to monitor than, say, an outright exclusive deal-
ing contract. A manufacturer who wanted to make sure dealers are giv-
ing proper billing to its products would have to visit its dealers 
regularly and monitor activities like product placement, local dealer 
advertising, and even the interactions between dealers and customers. 
Dealers terminated because they did not use best efforts could challenge 
those terminations in court, arguing about the meaning of ''best efforts" 
and whether they had in fact contravened such meaning.224 The result-
ing litigation could devolve into swearing contests about which shelves 
held which products and/ or whether the dealer's salesperson steered 
consumers away from the manufacturer's products. 
There is, however, a more fundamental reason that less restrictive 
alternative analysis does not make sense in this context. Any require-
ment that defendants achieve their objectives via the least restrictive 
means possible rests upon the assumption that the restraint's benefits 
coexist with some anticompetitive effects. Given this supposed coex-
istence, it makes sense to require the manufacturer to achieve its 
objectives through some means that produces less competitive harm 
than the restraint under challenge.225 However, where the plaintiff 
m See e.g., Bok, supra note 70, at 307-08. See also Standard Stations, supra 
note 15, at 313-14 (contending that parties would deal exclusively without 
contractual requirement if such exclusivity produced benefits). 
224 Of course, manufacturers could avoid this eventuality by requiring 
dealers to enter agreements allowing for at-will termination. However, such 
agreements would likely impose a cost on manufacturers, as dealers 
demanded some compensation for accepting the risk that comes with at-will 
termination provisions. 
225 See Meese, supra note 21, at 112 (explaining how rationale for less 
restrictive alternative test makes sense if one assumes that harms and benefits 
coexist). 
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makes out a prima facie case simply by showing a significant degree 
of foreclosure, and where the defendant adduces credible proof that 
such restrictions produce benefits, there is simply no basis for pre-
suming that the restraint's benefits coexist with harm.226 This is so 
even if the defendant is a monopolist. Instead, the evidence before the 
tribunal at this point will only support a conclusion that the restraint 
produces benefits.227 As a result, there is no basis for imposing upon a 
defendant a requirement of achieving benefits in a "less anticompeti-
tive manner," unless one equates mere foreclosure, without more, 
with anticompetitive harm.228 
Of course, "actual foreclosure" is not the only means of establish-
ing a prima facie case that an exclusive dealing contract is unlawful. 
Courts could also rely upon a showing that such an agreement pro-
duces actual anticompetitive harm, in the form of higher prices or 
reduced output.229 This, of course, was the approach taken by the 
Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, where 
the Justices found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case 
based upon the trial court's finding that the restraint had resulted in 
higher prices than would have existed in a "competitive" market.23° 
As I have argued elsewhere, the so-called actual detrimental 
effects test suffers from some of the same shortcomings as reliance 
upon the mere existence of a restraint to make out a prima facie case. 
226 See id. at 161-67. 
227 See nn.209-15, supra and accompanying text. 
228 See Meese, supra note 56, at 832-41; Meese, supra note 21, at 167-70. 
229 See United States v. Dentsply lnt'l, 277 F. Supp. 2d 387, 449 (Del. 2003) 
(stating that plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by proving that the 
restraint led to "reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in 
quality of goods or services") (quoting United States v. Brown University, 5 
F.3d 658, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1993)), rev'd on other grounds, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 
2005); Meese, supra note 21, at 105--07 (detailing so-called actual detrimental 
effects test applied by Supreme Court and many lower courts). 
230 468 U.S. at 85, 105--07 (1984). See also Mark Patterson, Market Power in 
Rule of Reason Cases, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (2000) (contending that best view 
of current law allows plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case in this 
manner). 
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As explained earlier, exclusive dealing arrangements avoid per se 
condemnation because they may plausibly overcome the sort of mar-
ket failure(s) that unbridled competition may produce.231 If cured, 
such failures will result in prices and output different from that 
which would occur in an unbridled market.232 If, for instance, a man-
ufacturer employs an exclusive dealing contract to prevent inter-
brand free riding, the result will be additional advertising and 
additional demand for the manufacturer's product.233 The additional 
advertising will cost money, money that consumers will pay in 
higher prices for the product on which they now place a higher 
value.234 If "successful," then, an exclusive dealing contract will actu-
ally increase the price of the product produced by the proponent of 
the agreement. 235 Moreover, an exclusive dealing contract that 
encourages specialized, specific investment may well result in higher 
prices, as such investments may enhance both the cost and quality of 
a manufacturer's product.236 
231 See nn.135-41, 161--65, supra and accompanying text. 
232 See Meese, supra note 21, at 147-61; Coase, supra note 8, at 717-18 
(background structure of legal entitlements can affect nature of economic 
activity and thus allocation of resources). 
233 See Marvel, supra note 99, at 7-8. 
234 See id. at 6--8. See also Meese, supra note 21, at 148-52 (explaining how 
some intrabrand restraints can facilitate promotion and thus result in prices 
higher than those that existed before the restraint). 
235 See generally Meese, supra note 21, at 148-52 (explaining how 
beneficial intrabrand restraints might lead to higher prices). Other scholars 
have reached similar conclusions about the price effects of intrabrand 
restraints. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Restraints and the Rule of 
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 156 (1984) ("Every restricted dealing 
arrangement is designed to influence price. It must be. If territorial limits 
induce dealers to supply additional service and information, they do so only 
because they raise the price and call forth competition in the service 
dimension .... Every argument about restricted dealing implies that the 
restrictions influence price. There is no such thing as a free lunch; the 
manufacturer can't get the dealer to do more without increasing the dealer's 
margin."). 
236 See nn.124-26, supra and accompanying text. 
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Application of an actual detrimental effects test to such agreements, 
then, does not make economic sense.237 Proof that such a restraint 
results in prices different from what would otherwise occur is equally 
consistent with two competing hypotheses. First, that the restraint has 
produced actual anticompetitive harm, or, second, that the restraint has 
overcome a market failure and therefore led to greater promotional 
expenditures or other specific investments and higher demand for the 
manufacturer's product.238 Thus, because such evidence is equally con-
sistent with two radically different accounts of such agreements, courts 
should not base a prima facie case on such evidence.239 Instead, where 
plaintiffs submit only such evidence, courts should dismiss the case.240 
Let us assume, however, that courts do allow plaintiffs to make out 
a prima facie case simply by showing that a restraint leads to higher 
prices. Assume further that the defendant is able to offer credible proof 
that the restriction produces significant benefits. Should courts then 
balance a restriction's benefits against its harms?241 In so doing, should 
237 Nor would such a test make sense if the fact that a restraint prevented 
an increase in a rival's output was deemed an "actual detrimental effect." See 
United States v. VISA, 344 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2003) (treating such an effect 
as a harm to competition). Such proof is equally consistent with a defendant's 
claim that the rivals hope to engage in opportunistic free riding, and that the 
restraint prevents such wealth-destroying behavior. 
238 See nn.121-31, supra and accompanying text (explaining how 
exclusive dealing agreements can overcome market failures). 
239 See nn.209-15, supra and accompanying text (explaining why evidence 
that is equally consistent with two interpretations should not give rise to a 
prima facie case). See also Meese, supra note 21, at 145451. 
240 See id. It should also go without saying that mere possession of market 
power should not suffice to establish a prima facie case or even militate in that 
direction. Even firms with market power enter efficient agreements unrelated 
to the acquisition or maintenance of market power. See Meese, supra note 137, 
at 66-94 (explaining how firms with market power can enter tying agreements 
that are in fact voluntary efficient integration). But see SULUVAN & GRIMEs, supra 
note 138, at 433, 439 (exclusive dealing contracts imposed by firms with market 
power are presumptively "forced" on dealers and thus anticompetitive). 
241 See VISA, 344 F.3d at 238 (rule of reason analysis of entails balancing); 
United States v. Dentsply Int'l, 277 F. Supp. 2d 387, 449 (Del. 2003), rev'd on 
other grounds, 399 F. 3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (same). 
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they apply a less restrictive alternative test?242 Here again, the answer 
should be no.243 After all, once a defendant shows that the restriction 
produces benefits, there is even less reason to believe that the restric-
tion produces competitive harm in the first place.244 To be sure, some 
evidence before the tribunal is consistent with a belief that the restraint 
produces harm. At the same time, such evidence is equally consistent 
with the hypothesis that the restriction overcomes a market failure. 
Moreover, given the defendant's proof that the restraint produces bene-
fits, the tribunal now has before it evidence that affirmatively estab-
lishes the restraint's beneficial properties. Given the very limited 
evidence of harm before the tribunal, the coexistence of benefits with 
harms would be sheer coincidence. Such speculation cannot support a 
requirement of balancing, or the related application of the less restric-
tive alternative test.245 
VII. TOWARD A MORE COHERENT APPROACH 
TO EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
How then, should courts go about evaluating claims that a given 
exclusive dealing arrangement violates the Sherman or Clayton Acts? 
In short, they must do the hard work of determining whether actual 
market conditions are such that a particular contract or set of contracts 
in fact raises the costs that a firm's rivals must pay for inputs in a man-
ner that allows the alleged predator to exercise power over price. Some 
courts seem to be moving in this direction.246 To establish a prima facie 
242 See VISA, 344 F.3d at 238 (courts should employ less restrictive 
alternative test when balancing a restraint's benefits against its harms). 
243 See nn.218-28, supra and accompanying text (explaining why courts 
should not take such an approach when plaintiffs make out a prima facie case 
based simply on foreclosure). 
244 Cf. nn.231-36, supra and accompanying text (explaining that mere 
proof that restriction results in prices different from those that preexisted the 
restraint does not itself justify a prima facie case). 
245 See nn.202-28, supra and accompanying text. 
246 See, e.g., Omega Envtl, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-65 
(9th Cir. 1997) (finding that exclusive dealing contracts did not produce 
anticompetitive harm, despite foreclosing 38% of the market, where 
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case, then, a plaintiff should have to prove the existence of a relevant 
input market, using an approach to market definition like that 
employed by the Merger Guidelines.247 Plaintiffs should also establish a 
relevant output market in which the predator will purportedly exercise 
market power if the strategy succeeds.248 After establishing these two 
relevant markets, plaintiffs should then show that entry into each mar-
ket is sufficiently difficult that an RRC strategy could succeed.249 
Of course, proof that market structure is conducive to a successful 
raising rivals' costs strategy does not mean that the defendant is actu-
ally pursuing such a strategy, or that the strategy will succeed. 
Instead, the plaintiff must prove that, if enforced, the contracts under 
challenge will actually raise the price that rivals must pay for inputs, 
in a manner that can confer upon the predator power over price.25o As 
professors Krattenmaker and Salop have pointed out, courts gener-
ally cannot infer or hypothesize such increases from proxies, but 
instead must usually measure such impacts directly.251 If a plaintiff 
agreements did not deter entry). See also Jacobson, supra note 15, at 328 
(contending that some recent decisions have shifted focus from foreclosure as 
such to whether such agreements help proponents acquire or maintain 
market power). 
247 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 255-57 (invoking merger 
guidelines as appropriate framework for determining whether a rival's costs 
are raised). 
248 See id. at 262-66. In so doing, plaintiffs need to take account of 
downstream competition faced by the defendant and its rivals in the output 
market. 
249 See id. at 267. Here again, plaintiffs could employ the approach to entry 
analysis articulated in the Merger Guidelines and employed by some courts. See 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Joint Merger Guidelines, 
§ 3. See also FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc. 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. D.C. 1998). 
250 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 254-62. 
251 See id. at 258-59 (where plaintiff claims that exclusionary rights 
contracts preempt low-cost input suppliers, courts must measure the costs 
of various input suppliers directly, because "no surrogate standard 
exists"). The qualification "generally" is meant to leave room for cases in 
which plaintiffs claim that a restraint creates a market environment that 
facilitates actual or tacit collusion among remaining input suppliers. See 
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cannot prove that remaining input suppliers have significantly higher 
costs than those bound by the challenged exclusive dealing contracts, 
its case should usually fail.252 
Even if the plaintiff can establish each of the elements described 
so far, it has still not shown that the restraint will necessarily produce 
competitive harm. Such proof does not exclude the possibility that the 
purported victims of the scheme will be able to avail themselves of 
successful predatory counterstrategies.253 For instance, a manufac-
turer that seeks to raise its rivals' costs by entering exclusive arrange-
ments may find that potential victims of such conduct, including the 
dealers themselves, may resist, often with the assistance of the manu-
facturer's own rivals.254 While individual dealers may not find it ratio-
nal to resist such a strategy, several dealers could band together and 
agree not to sign exclusive agreements with the putative predator.255 
id. at 240-42 (describing so-called Frankenstein monster strategy). Where the 
plaintiff alleges that such a strategy is afoot, it should bear the burden of 
proving that conditions in the relevant input market are such that such 
collusion is likely. See generally PoSNER, supra note 146, at 69-93 (outlining 
numerous factors that will determine whether actual or tacit collusion is 
likely in a particular market). 
252 Here again, the qualification "usually'' is reserved for those instances 
in which a plaintiff challenges a restraint because it supposedly facilitates 
collusion among remaining input suppliers. In such cases, the plaintiff need 
prove "only" that a restraint will likely lead to actual or tacit conclusion 
among remaining input suppliers. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, 
at 240-42 (describing so-called Frankenstein monster strategy where restraint 
induces actual or tacit collusion among remaining input suppliers). 
253 See id. at 268-72 (examining possibility that such counterstrategies can 
prevent RRC strategy from succeeding). 
254 See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 146, at 231-33 (explaining how such 
counterstrategies could thwart predatory use of allegedly exclusionary 
leasing provisions); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 
238 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.) (suggesting that potential victim of predatory 
strategy would resist agreements that solidify a predator's market power). 
255 Cf. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (describing buying 
cooperatives whereby single-store pharmacies bargained collectively with 
large wholesalers); Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 
433 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing organization of franchises that collectively 
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Or, these dealers could even merge, thereby creating a "single owner" 
of the costs and benefits of entering such agreements with a potential 
predator.256 Such collective action could thwart a predator's efforts to 
confer market power on itself by entering exclusive dealing arrange-
ments.257 
Collective action by input suppliers is not the only possible coun-
terstrategy. Instead, rivals themselves may respond to such strategies. 
For one thing, rivals may seek to organize suppliers through vertical 
agreements that prevent these suppliers from pursuing exclusivity 
strategies.258 Or, rivals may integrate forward or backward and thus 
assure themselves of a sufficient supply of reasonably-priced 
inputs.259 Such integration may be de novo, as when a firm resolves to 
produce such inputs from scratch.260 Or, rivals may purchase input 
purchased inputs). To be sure, overbroad antitrust prohibitions could prevent 
such collective agreement on the terms at which dealers sold their services. If 
so, then the proper remedy would seem to be the relaxation of these counter-
productive rules, and not unduly aggressive rules regarding exclusionary 
rights agreements. 
256 For instance, numerous franchisees could merge into one firm that 
owns numerous franchise outlets. 
257 I do not mean to suggest that these dealers would be exercising 
"countervailing power" vis a vis a putative predator. See Cardinal Health, 12 F. 
Supp.2d at 42 (characterizing group purchasing organizations as exercising 
"buying power" and leverage vis a vis upstream sellers). Instead, I am 
arguing that these firms would, by acting collectively, internalize the costs of 
any market power the predator threatens to acquire and thus have optimal 
incentives to resist such a strategy. Such resistance would simply consist of 
refusal to enter such agreements absent a price concession large enough to 
make the strategy unprofitable for the putative predator. 
258 Cf. POSNER, supra note 146, at 231-33. 
259 See, e.g., William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Antitrust on Internet Time: 
Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 157, 225 
(1999) (contending that merger between Netscape and AOL would ensure 
former's access to latter's distribution system). 
260 Cf. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43 (explaining how large 
chain pharmacies themselves took on a warehousing function previously 
performed by independent warehouses). 
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suppliers outright and thereby obtain an assured supply.261 Of course, 
both forms of integration are presumptively less efficient than the sta-
tus quo ante, which rivals chose independent of the threat of preda-
tion. At the same time, such strategies may be preferable to a world in 
which the predator's strategy succeeds. To the extent that rivals can 
credibly threaten to adopt such a strategy, putative predators will 
likely forgo an RRC strategy, as such a strategy will lead to a smaller 
increase in rivals' costs than a predator might have anticipated.262 
These strategies may sometimes fail for different reasons. Still, a court 
should not condemn an exclusive dealing agreement as an unlawful 
raising rivals' costs strategy until it can first assure itself that such 
counterstrategies will not succeed. 
Let us assume, then, that the plaintiff has adduced the evidence 
necessary to cast upon the defendant the burden of proving that 
counterstrategies will thwart a successful RRC strategy. Assume also 
that the defendant is unable to adduce such evidence. Should a court 
enter judgment for the plaintiff? The answer, of course, is no. For, at 
this point, all a plaintiff has done is establish a prima facie case under 
the rule of reason. A defendant is thus entitled to adduce proof that, 
261 See Page & Lopatka, supra note 259, at 225 (explaining how Netscape's 
merger with AOL provided the former with an outlet for its products). 
262 One could argue that a putative predator would be pleased to induce 
inefficient integration by its rivals, because such integration would itself raise 
rivals' costs. Cf. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 269 (contending that 
counterstrategy that requires rivals to pay a premium to avoid exclusion 
themselves raise rivals' costs and thus achieve the predator's objective). Two 
considerations would seem to undermine this contention in many cases. First, 
any inefficiency may be so trivial as to deprive it of any competitive 
significance. For instance, integration that raised a firm's overall costs by 
three percent would not confer upon the predator the sort of power over 
price ordinarily deemed significant for antitrust purposes. See Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Joint Merger Guidelines,§ 1.11 
(employing five percent test for purpose of defining relevant markets). 
Second, the predator's costs of pursuing such a strategy may be greater than 
the minor benefits that result. 
Finally, it should also be noted that some rivals may experience lower 
costs of integration than others. If some of the predator's rivals can integrate 
forward or backward with relative ease, then an RRC strategy will fail. 
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despite evidence that an RRC strategy is afoot, the restraint produces 
significant benefits.263 If a defendant does prove that a restriction pro-
duces significant efficiencies, then the finder of fact has no choice but 
to balance these benefits against the anticompetitive harms presump-
tively produced by the restraint. Moreover, courts that truly engage 
in such balancing cannot rely upon shortcuts to assist them. So, for 
instance, courts cannot shortcut the balancing process simply by 
examining whether the restraint in question resulted in higher 
prices.264 As noted earlier, such price increases may be equally consis-
tent with the defendant's claim that such restraints reduce transaction 
costs and overcome a market failure. 26S Thus, proof that a restriction 
results in higher prices may simply confirm that the restraint 
enhances interbrand competition. 
How, then, should courts and agencies go about balancing a 
restraint's benefits against its harms? The answer to this question 
depends critically upon the normative account of antitrust that one 
adopts. According to some scholars, the antitrust laws ban all 
restraints that reduce the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market 
compared to the status quo ante, even if the restriction increases soci-
ety's welfare.266 Others, however, have argued or assumed that the 
263 See nn.164-65, supra and accompanying text. 
264 It should be noted that some courts, scholars and agencies have 
suggested that reliance upon such a short cut is appropriate. See FfC and DOJ 
Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, § 3.1 ("Under the rule of reason, the 
central question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition 
by increasing the ability or incentive profitably to raise price or reduce 
output, quality or service below what likely would prevail in the absence of 
the relevant agreement."); id. at§ 2.1 (1996) (same). See also NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents Univ. Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (any attempt to justify a 
restriction must fail because the restriction led to higher prices for the 
defendants' products); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 149, at 279 
(assuming that cost reductions produced by nonstandard agreements will, 
other things being equal, reduce prices). 
265 See nn.231-40, supra and accompanying text. 
266 See Robert H. Lande, The Rise and Coming Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler 
of Antitrust, 33 AmrrRuST BULL 429 (1988); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as 
the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation 
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65 (1982) [hereinafter Wealth Transfers]. 
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statutes only ban those restrictions that destroy wealth compared to 
the status quo ante.267 Under this latter approach, a restraint can be 
lawful even if it results in the exercise of market power and higher 
consumer prices, so long as the restraint's benefits outweigh any 
deadweight losses.268 
Each of these normative accounts implies a different approach to 
balancing, as scholars have recognized in the merger context.269 Under 
a purchaser welfare approach, for instance, courts would "simply" 
ask whether a given restriction reduces the welfare of purchasers. 
This inquiry would be relatively straightforward in the merger con-
text, where all purchasers presumably suffer harm if efficiencies do 
not counteract any resulting market power. In these cases, courts 
must "only" determine the magnitude of cost reductions and the ulti-
mate demand elasticity facing the firm.27° From these two variables, a 
court can predict whether a restriction will increase or decrease the 
prices that consumers will pay for the products in question.271 
Such balancing may be far more complicated with regard to 
exclusive dealing contracts that both create market power and over-
267 See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. 
L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) (contending that Congress meant courts to apply a "total 
welfare" approach to interpreting and applying the Sherman Act). See also BoRK, 
Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 107-15 (arguing that courts should ignore 
distributional concerns when applying the Sherman Act); Timothy J. Muris, The 
Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE WESTERN L. REv. 381 
(1980) (assuming that a total welfare approach would apply to any 
consideration of efficiencies in the merger context); Williamson, supra note 50 
(applying a total welfare approach when analyzing the impact of efficiencies on 
merger analysis). 
268 See BoRK, Antitrust Paradox, supra note 83, at 107-15. 
2ffJ Compare id. at 107 (employing merger that simultaneously produces 
market power and efficiencies as exemplar to illustrate all antitrust problems); 
id. at 107-15 (explaining how courts should go about determining whether a 
restraint enhances total welfare) with Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 266, 
at 74-77 (detailing standard based upon harm to consumers simpliciter). 
270 Cf. Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Walter Vandaele, Could a 
Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CAuF. L. REv. 1697 (1983). 
271 Cf. id. 
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come transaction costs. In this context, the benefits of the contract 
need not manifest themselves in the form of lower production costs as 
they do under the conventional merger paradigm. While these 
restraints "reduce" transaction costs, such reductions manifest them-
selves by overcoming market failure and encouraging investments 
that otherwise would not occur in an unbridled marketplace.272 In 
such cases the benefits of the restraint may consist of the additional 
surplus that consumers realize because of the improved product. Or, 
additional manufacturer advertising may educate consumers, thereby 
inducing them to make better purchasing decisions and thus improve 
their welfare.273 To be sure, the price of the products sold will reflect 
the defendants' newly acquired market power. And, some consumers 
may suffer as a result.274 Still, at least some consumers may be better 
off than they would have been had the defendant never entered the 
restraint. In each such example, then, exclusive dealing agreements 
can overcome market failures and enhance the welfare of at least 
some purchasers in the marketplace, despite any resulting exercise of 
market power.275 Although socially justified, such investments may 
actually increase a firm's production costs and thus not tend to 
reduce prices.276 Nonetheless, and despite any price increases, such 
restraints may still produce net benefits for the purchasers in the rele-
vant market. For instance, additional specific investment may allow a 
firm to produce better products-or even different products-from 
those that would exist if the firms involved simply relied upon an 
unbridled market to distribute their products.277 
272 See nn.121-31, supra. 
273 See nn.127-31, supra and accompanying text (explaining how 
exclusive dealing can eliminate interbrand externalities). 
274 For instance, there may be very knowledgeable customers who would 




See nn.l21-31, supra and accompanying text. 
See nn.231-36, supra and accompanying text. 
277 For reasons described earlier, it seems unlikely that there will be less 
restrictive alternatives that will produce the same benefits as these 
agreements. 
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If exclusive dealing arrangements that confer market power and 
raise consumer prices can nonetheless improve the welfare of some 
purchasers in the market, then courts and the enforcement agencies 
that hope to employ a purchaser welfare standard will have to 
develop some method of determining the net purchaser benefit (or 
harm) that a restraint produces. So far as I am aware, no scholar, 
judge or enforcement official has offered a method for determining 
which effect on purchaser welfare predominates in such mixed cases. 
Courts would have equal difficulty balancing harms and benefits 
if they embraced a "total welfare" approach. Recall that, in the merger 
context, courts need simply calculate the deadweight loss produced 
by the restraint and then compare that loss to the reduced production 
costs that the newly merged firm enjoys because of the transaction.278 
By contrast, where a restraint reduces transaction costs, courts will 
find it more difficult to calculate the benefits of the restraint, which do 
not manifest themselves as shifts in a preexisting production cost 
curve. The transaction costs that a restraint avoids are often hypothet-
ical, i.e., the costs that a firm would have incurred if it had instead 
relied upon an unbridled market.279 For instance, a manufacturer that 
relied upon an exclusive dealing agreement to avoid interbrand free 
riding would thereby avoid the "cost" of reduced demand for its 
product or less efficient forward integration. 
Given the difficulty of measuring such costs, courts and enforce-
ment agencies that embrace a total welfare approach to antitrust may 
decide to eschew any pretense of balancing and instead simply 
declare any restraint that produces significant benefits lawful, pre-
suming that the benefits of such a restraint outweigh its social costs.280 
This is exactly the approach that courts take to purely unilateral prac-
278 See Williamson, supra note 50, at 21-27 (employing this approach to 
analyze welfare impact of mergers). 
279 See nn.120--31, supra and accompanying text. 
280 See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 15-16 (embracing total welfare 
approach and contending that courts should err on the side of allowing 
restrictions of uncertain effect). This approach is similar to that advocated by 
professor Hovenkamp for intrabrand restraints. See HovENKAMP, supra note 
184, at489. 
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tices by individual firms. If, for instance, a firm realizes slight 
economies of scale and underprices a competitor, courts will not bal-
ance the benefits of the conduct against its allocative losses. On the 
contrary, courts treat such "competition on the merits" as lawful per 
se, and beyond antitrust scrutiny.281 The theory of the firm, of course, 
teaches that such "unilateral" conduct is in fact the product of a web 
of agreements between potentially independent actors, including 
exclusive agreements.2B2 Similar treatment of exclusive dealing agree-
ments that produce significant benefits would thus ensure similar 
treatment of economically similar phenomena.283 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Antitrust's traditional hostility toward exclusive dealing agree-
ments between separate firms rested upon neoclassical price theory 
and its technological conception of the business firm. Price theory and 
its theory of the firm excluded the possibility that nonstandard con-
tracts, including exclusive dealing, that reached beyond the firm pro-
duced economic benefits and thus led scholars, enforcers and courts 
to infer that such agreements were manifestations of market power. 
The result was the so-called inhospitality tradition of antitrust law, 
whereby agencies and courts condemned various nonstandard con-
tracts as unlawful per se or nearly so. 
Price theory did not retain its monopoly on industrial organiza-
tion forever. Instead, the inhospitality tradition produced two chal-
lenges: the Chicago school and transaction cost economics. Taken 
together these schools of thought convinced courts and most scholars 
that exclusive dealing and other nonstandard contracts could often 
produce significant benefits, thus undermining the inference on 
which the inhospitality tradition rested. Moreover, TCE surmised that 
"the firm" was simply a particular form of nonstandard contract, 
indistinguishable from less complete forms of economic integration. 
Shortly thereafter, scholars generated the RRC paradigm, which 
281 
283 
See Meese, supra note 56, at 757-59 (collecting authorities). 
See id. at 837-41. 
See id. 
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offered a new explanation of how some nonstandard contracts could 
be anticompetitive. 
The doctrine governing exclusive dealing contracts has come a 
long way. At the same time, it does not appear that courts have fully 
internalized the teachings of transaction cost economics. For one 
thing, some courts at least rely too heavily upon foreclosure as the 
basis for a prima facie case, particularly in monopolization cases. 
Moreover, once such a case arises, courts are too quick to balance a 
restraint's benefits against purported harms or to shortcut such bal-
ancing by finding that a less restrictive alternative would produce the 
same benefits as the restraint. 
A rigorous application of TCE and RRC theory suggests that 
courts should require much more than mere foreclosure to establish a 
prima facie case, even if the defendant has a monopoly. Instead, 
courts should require plaintiffs to establish the various necessary con-
ditions for an RRC strategy to succeed. If the defendants cannot prove 
that rivals' tactics will thwart such a strategy, courts should then 
require the defendants to show that the restriction produces signifi-
cant benefits. If such proof is forthcoming, the court should then bal-
ance a restraint's harm against its benefits, with the outcome of such 
balancing likely turning upon the normative premise that courts 
adopt. If courts adopt a total welfare approach, proof that a restraint 
produces significant benefits should itself entitle the defendant to 
judgment, without regard to further balancing. If, on the other hand, 
courts adopt a purchaser welfare approach, they will have to develop 
some methodology for balancing the harms to some purchasers 
against the benefits that such restraints may confer on others. 
